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MILITARY POLICE

(ENGLISH)

(Supersedes B-SI-315-004/FT-001 dated 1973-11-30)

WARNING

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Issued on the authority of the Chief of Land Staff

OPI: DAD 8-4 **2000-11-10**

Canada

FOREWORD

1. B-GL-362-001/FP-001 *Military Police* is issued on the authority of the Chief of the Defence Staff.

2. It is effective on receipt and supersedes B-SI-315-004/FT-001 *Military Police in the Field* dated 30 November 1973.

3. Suggestions for amendments should be forwarded through normal channels to the Chief Land Staff, attention DAD 8-4.

4. Unless otherwise noted, masculine pronouns apply to both men and women.

5. The National Defence Index of Documentation (NDID) for the French version of this manual is B-GL-362-001/FP-002 *Police militaire*.

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PREFACE

1. The approach outlined in this manual is consistent with previous Canadian army Military Police doctrine but builds upon it with innovative ideas and concepts. This manual explains the Canadian army's approach to providing Military Police support to operations within the context of manoeuvrist approach to operations. In doing so, it is descriptive rather than prescriptive, requiring judgement in application. It does not establish dogma or provide a checklist of procedures, but is rather an authoritative guide. It is definitive enough to guide military activity, yet versatile enough to accommodate a variety of situations. Although the manual's primary focus is on Military Police in combat operations at the tactical level, the doctrine and concepts outlined apply equally across the spectrum of conflict. Military Police should strive to apply the same philosophy as described in this manual, to support their commander in all types of operations, ranging from garrison support, operations other than war to combat operations. Military Police are integral soldiers of their unit and formation. Military Police exist to support their units and formations within the confines of the law, regulation, technical direction, and as directed by the chain of command.

BACKGROUND

2. Past manuals for the provision of Military Police support to the Army were a mixture of doctrine and Techniques, Tactics and Procedures. At that time Military Police Platoons were integral to Service Battalions and the contents prescribed the manner in which Military Police would execute their tasks. Since then, the way Military Police provide support has changed. Military Police are independent units within every formation and their support has become more indispensable than in the past. This is due, in great part, to the evolution of our operational environment and of technology.

3. A short history of the Canadian Provost Corp is included at Annex B providing an historical perspective of the Army Military Police.

4. The purpose of this manual is to establish the doctrinal basis for the provision of Military Police support to tactical units and formations of the Canadian army

PURPOSE

4. The purpose of this manual is to establish the doctrinal basis for the provision of Military Police support to tactical units and formations of the Canadian army.

SCOPE

5. This manual provides tactical level support doctrine within the context of joint and/or combined operations. The Joint Staff at National Defence Headquarters publishes Canadian Forces strategic and operational level doctrine. Canadian Forces Military Police doctrine is contained in Chapter 21 of B-GG-005-004/AF-000 *Canadian Forces Operations.*[1]

6. Doctrine included in this manual is not intended to replace policy, direction or procedures provided in Canadian Forces references such as the *Canadian Forces Administrative Order 22-4 Security and Military Police Services,* A-SJ-100-004/AG-000 *Canadian Forces Military Police Policies and Technical Procedures*[2] or A-SJ-100-001/AS-001 *National Defence Security Instructions.*[3] These references have precedence and apply throughout the spectrum of conflict. They provide guidance to Security Officers for the employment of Military Police in some Military Police or Security tasks.

7. While firmly based upon the foundations established in B-GL-300-000/FP-000 *Canada's Army,* B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations – Operational Level Doctrine for the*

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[1] Currently published electronically at: http://dcds.dwan.dnd.ca/din_locl/dpdt/English/J7DLLS(e)/DLLS2/Doctrine(e).html.

[2] This manual, upon completion, will supersede A-SJ-100-004/AG-000 *Military Police Policies* dated 1996-08-27.

[3] This manual is replacing A-SJ-100-001/AS-001 *National Defence Security Procedures* in increments.

Canadian Army, B-GL-300-002/FP-000 *Land Force Tactical Doctrine* and B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command*, this manual expands on the principles presented in B-GL-300-006/FP-001 *Land Force Protection.*[4] This manual is the primary source for Army Military Police doctrine.

8. The content of this manual emphasizes a philosophy of command based on the disciplined use of initiative guided by an understanding of the higher commander's intent. This philosophy is a prerequisite for implementing the Canadian approach to operations and for coping with high-tempo operations amidst the friction, chaos, uncertainty and violence of combat. It is not based upon, nor does it call for, any particular equipment suite or force structure. It does not depend on specific technologies or numbers of soldiers. It remains applicable in the broadest number of circumstances involving any configuration of joint and combined military forces.

9. International agreements and procedures have been agreed upon by members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the American, British, Canadian and Australian (ABCA) Quadripartite forum. These are published in various standardization agreements (*STANAGS* for NATO and *QSTAGS* for ABCA) and APP-12 *NATO Military Police Doctrine* (Study Draft 1). Agreements specific to Military Police have been incorporated in this manual and B-GL-332-012/FP-001 *Tactical Aide-Memoire Insert—Military Police* and the list of agreements is provided at Annex D.

10. *Military Police Doctrine* embraces the concepts of Host and Lead Support Nations concepts. Commanders will have to determine with which approach units and formations can best be supported. Usually a combination of national, host nation and lead nation support is used for economy of effort.

11. The manual is divided into six chapters. Chapter 1 introduces the fundamentals of Army operations and Chapter 2 provides the general principles for employment of Military Police. Chapters 3 to 6 provide doctrine for the four Military Police functions: **Mobility Support**, **Security**, **Detention** and **Police Operations**. Supporting

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[4] B-GL-300-006/FP-001 *Land Force Protection* is currently in draft and is scheduled for publication in 2000.

4. The purpose of this manual is to establish the doctrinal basis for the provision of Military Police support to tactical units and formations of the Canadian army

information is contained within annexes included at the end of the manual.

TERMINOLOGY

12. The terminology used in this manual is consistent with that of *Army Vocabulary* and AAP-6 (V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.

13. A glossary and a list of acronyms can be found at the end of the manual.

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CHAPTER 1
FUNDAMENTALS OF ARMY OPERATIONS

Soldiers win wars.

Major A.G. Copeman, Canadian Reserve Security Officer, *Military Police Standing Operating Procedures*, 1979

SECTION 1
GENERAL

INTRODUCTION

1. Military Police doctrinal concepts described in this manual must be understood in the context of broader doctrinal changes within the Canadian army. The primary change in Canadian army doctrine is the adaptation of the manoeuvrist approach to operations. This chapter will introduce the manoeuvrist approach, combat power and how these apply to Military Police. These concepts are described in B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army* and expanded upon in B-GL-300-002/FP-000 *Land Force Tactical Doctrine*. To be successful manouverists, commanders at all levels must be comfortable with mission analysis, commander's intent, and mission orders as is explained in B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command.*

ROLE

2. The fundamental role of Canada's Army is to defend the nation and, when called upon, to fight and win its wars. The Army may fulfil this role through deterrence, which requires the maintenance

4. The purpose of this manual is to establish the doctrinal basis for the provision of Military Police support to tactical units and formations of the Canadian army

of forces that are credible and visible in peace and conflict, or through the conduct of combat operations if deterrence fails.[5]

3. The role of Military Police is to provide commanders with an essential element of command and control, through the conduct of four functions: Mobility Support, Security, Detention, and Police Operations. These functions will be described in the following chapters.

MILITARY POLICE SOLDIERS

4. Soldiers are the most valuable assets available to the Army. They are key to success in operations. Provided with sound doctrine, individual and collective training, procedures and adequate equipment, they are capable of fulfilling the commander's intent. Our efforts must strive to sew them into a cohesive group amongst themselves and with other units and formations to enable them to successfully deliver the support required.

5. Military Police assigned to the Army are all soldiers, with a dual responsibility, that of a soldier policeman. They are professional police persons and professional soldiers. They participate in operations through the spectrum of conflict and help the commander in achieving the mission. Leaders will study doctrine and soldiers will learn and apply doctrine through tactics and procedures. Together they will fulfil the duties assigned in a professional manner at all times. All Military Police will conduct themselves in accordance with the Canadian Forces Code of Conduct and the Military Police Professional Code of Conduct.

6. The Military Police Reserve Forces form an integral component of the Army. Military Police Reserve Force members do not normally possess peace officer status, but they do form the mobilization base and augment the regular force Military Police during selected taskings and operations at home or abroad. The inherent limitations placed on the Reserve Force Military Police

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[5] B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, p. ii.

MP

The **M** and the **P** are equal.
Emphasis on the military or the policing is non-existent.
MP are professional military soldiers and policemen / policewomen.

members exist because of their lack of peace officer status, reduced readiness, and often their unavailability for prolonged service. This is understandable and accepted by both reserve and regular force members. Within these constraints, leaders must ensure that reserve and regular force members are employed to complement each other effectively.

Figure 1-1: The Professional MP

7. The Canadian Forces Provost Marshal's policy dictates that all Military Police persons employed in police operations possess peace officer status in accordance with approved training standards. Some Reserve Force Military Police personnel may be trained to these standards or be provided equivalencies[6] complemented by additional required training and subsequently selected to occupy positions requiring peace officer status.

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[6] *Defence Administrative Orders and Directives* (DAOD) 5031-1, Canadian Forces Military Equivalencies.

DOCTRINE

8. Doctrine is the first step in moulding together a group of persons as soldiers of a fighting formation. Doctrine represents the fundamental teachings of our profession and it establishes the way we practice this profession in the Canadian army. It forms the foundation for any subordinate doctrine, techniques, tactics and procedures, standing operating procedures and training manuals by enunciating the concepts accepted by the Army. Doctrine also justifies how we structure, organize, equip and operate. Additionally, as members of the Military Police Branch, Military Police must adhere to the policing standards set by the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal.

9. Military Police doctrine is integrated with other Army doctrine and with that of our closest allies. It is intended to guide Military Police at all levels to function effectively. Current police standards, procedures, and security policy published by the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal have been identified in this manual. Their continued application is mandatory.

TRAINING

10. Training is key to combat effectiveness. Commanders and staff must be knowledgeable of Military Police capabilities and limitations.[7] Conversely, Military Police staff, officers and non-commissioned officers must be conversant with Army and allied doctrine and they must stay abreast of the operational situation to effectively provide the required support.

11. **Individual Training Standards**. All soldiers providing Military Police support must be highly trained in their field of speciality–mobility support, security, detention and policing, as well as those basic soldier skills required on the battlefield. Military Police

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[7] It is expected that future versions of B-GL-331-005/FP-001 *Canadian Land Force Electronic Battle Box* will provide details of capabilities and limitation of units.

must develop an expertise with the operational equipment and the most up-to-date procedures to enable them to face the challenges of the modern battlefield. They must be disciplined and they must ensure they execute their duties professionally at all times. Individual Battle Tasks [8] have been developed to provide Army standards for all soldiers. Dependent on the unit operational readiness level, soldiers will be required to achieve designated levels of capabilities.

12. **Collective Training Standards**. In addition to individual training, realistic and challenging collective training is required to enable units to master procedures and to ultimately achieve sub-unit and unit cohesiveness and success in operations. Battle Task Standards are the means by which the Army ensures skills are maintained and validated at unit level. *Military Police Battle Task Standards*[9] establish the collective training standards that must be achieved from Military Police patrols up to platoon level.

STANDING OPERATING PROCEDURES

13. Standing operating procedures facilitate the provision of necessary support. A common understanding of such procedures amongst Canadian army and allied personnel during periods of high tempo, battle fatigue and uncertainty simplify the accomplishment of tasks. These procedures are not to be construed as rules but rather as mechanisms that are generally applied to facilitate the provision of support. Canadian army *Formation Standing Operating Procedures,*[10] *Unit Standing Operating Procedures,*[11] and a *Tactical Aide-Memoire*[12]

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[8] B-GL-383-003/FP-003 *Individual Battle Tasks* is scheduled for publication in 2001.

[9] B-GL-383-002/PT-021 *Military Police Battle Task Standards.*

[10] B-GL-333-001/FP-001 *Formation Standing Operating Procedures.*

[11] B-GL-332-001/FP-001 Volume 1, *Unit Standing Operating Procedures.*

[12] B-GL-332-001/FP-001 Volume 2, *Tactical Aide-Memoire.*

provide the common procedures. Leaders must be familiar with the procedures and are required to apply them. The *Unit Standing Operating Procedures* and *Formation Standing Operating Procedures* are applicable to all unit and formations and cover most of the common procedures required. They respect Canadian agreements with our allies for ease of interoperability. Specific Army Military Police procedures are detailed in the *Tactical Aide-Memoire Insert—Military Police.*[13]

SECTION 2
THE OPERATIONAL ENVIRONMENT

MANOEUVERIST APPROACH TO OPERATIONS

14. Canadian army doctrine is based on the Canadian principles of war, our representation of Combat Power and its embodiment in the manoeuvrist approach to operations. This approach to fighting seeks to attack the enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion, and his ability to fight as an effective coordinated whole rather than destroying him by incremental attrition. It strikes a balance between use of physical destruction and moral coercion, emphasizing the importance of the latter in attacking the enemy's will. The shattering of the enemy's cohesion is achieved through a series of rapid, violent, and unexpected actions that create a turbulent and rapidly deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope. Attacks are directed against the enemy's moral components—particularly his willpower, his military plans, his ability to manoeuvre, his command and control ability and his morale. These actions are integrated to seize and maintain the initiative, outpace the enemy, and keep him off balance.[14] In order to

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[13] B-GL-332-012/FP-001 *Tactical Aide-Mémoire Insert—Military Police.*

[14] B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, p. 2-3.

attack enemy cohesion, there are three approaches: **pre-emption, dislocation** and **disruption**.[15]

15. One important foundation of our doctrine is the maintenance of our own cohesion. Cohesion reflects the unity of effort in a force, it includes the influence of a commander's well-articulated intent focussed at a common goal, the motivation and esprit de corps of the force, and the physical components necessary to integrate and apply combat power. One contributor to force cohesion is the commander's freedom of action in which the Military Police assist. Effort must ensure the commander retains the initiative and freedom of action required for him to apply combat power and fight on his terms, not the enemy's. This is achieved through the uninterrupted mobility of units and formations required for him to maintain the tempo desired to fix and strike the enemy when and where he chooses. Military Police must also assist in the protection of disruptions posed by refugees and evacuees. Freedom of action is vital to the commander; we must strive to protect it from dislocation or disruption. Security Operations aim to reduce the threat against friendly forces by denying the enemy essential information on friendly intentions.

16. Most importantly, the manoeuvrist approach to operations is an attitude of mind; commanders think and react faster than their foes in order to mass friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses and to attack his vulnerabilities; be they moral or physical.[16] Where possible existing weak points are exploited, failing that, they must be created. Enemy strength is avoided and combat power is targeted to strike at his critical assets (lines of communications, headquarters, rear areas, reserve forces etc.) via his weaknesses. Note that it is acknowledged that battles of attrition will likely be fought as part of the manoeuvrist approach.

17. The battlefield will no longer resemble that of the past. Linear lines dividing units and formations are no longer the norm.

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[15] These approaches are described in B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, p. 2-4.

[16] B-GL-300-002/FP-000 *Land Force Tactical Doctrine*, p. 1-11.



Units and formations will occupy terrain as dictated by the mission assigned. The map will display areas sometime interlocking and in other instances separated by several kilometres. The rear area, as known in the past, will either continue to be distanced from the immediate combat area and located in a more secure environment. Most likely there will be no such thing as a secured area. Manoeuvre arms, support arms and support services troops will be interspersed throughout the framework of the battlefield, therefore making it impossible to achieve the classical linear and layered security posture. Figure 1-2 illustrates the future battlefield.

Figure 1-2: Non Contiguous Operations

COMBAT POWER

18. Armies use combat power to **fix** and **strike** the enemy. Combat power is the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force that a military unit/formation can apply against the opponent at a given time. It is generated through the integration of several elements, called combat functions. To produce the desired effect on the enemy, combat power is applied through a combination of fixing and striking to attack moral and physical cohesion. The Army defines six combat functions. They are **command, information operations, manoeuvre,**

firepower, protection and **sustainment**.[17] Although Military Police is a support arm contributing largely to Protection, its efforts contribute to all other combat functions. The Military Police have four main functions: Mobility Support, Security, Detention and Police Operations. These functions are introduced in Chapter 2 and detailed individually in subsequent chapters.

19. The integration of combat functions aims to convert the potential of forces, resources and opportunities into a capability that is greater than the sum of the parts. Integration and co-ordination are used to produce violent, synchronized action decisive in time, space, purpose and place to defeat the enemy. The practical expression of the combat functions is **combat power**-the total means of destructive and/or disruptive force which a military unit or formation can apply against an opponent at a given time and place. The application of tempo, the designation of a main effort and synchronization generate combat power through the integration of the combat functions.[18] Figure 1-3 depicts combat power.

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[17] B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, p. 2-6.

[18] B-GL-300-002/FP-000 *Land Force Tactical Doctrine*, pp. 1-11 and 2-6.


IMPOSE WILL BY
MORAL FORCES
Cohesion and Will to Win
Professionalism
Ethos
Leadership
Morale and Esprit de corps
Doctrine and Training
Command-Philosophy
1
2
3
4
5
6
*
Tempo
Synchronization
Main Effort
PHYSICAL FORCES
Troops
Weapons
Equipment
Materiel and Resources
Technology
* 1. Information Operations
2. Firepower
3. Sustainment
4. Protection
5. Manœuvre
6. Command
COMBAT POWER
FIX
STRIKE
Dislocate
Pre-empt
Disrupt
ENEMY COHESION
ENEMY WILL
SUCCESS
END STATE

Figure 1-3: Combat Power

TACTICAL ORGANIZATION OF THE BATTLEFIELD

20. Deep, Close and Rear Operations[19] are likely to be fought concurrently to defeat the enemy simultaneously throughout his depth. Rear Operations refer to operations in the friendly force rear area and

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[19] B-GL-300-002/FP-000 *Land Force Tactical Doctrine*, pp. 1-13 to 1-16.

underpin both deep and close operations. They ensure freedom of action of the force by sustaining combat operations and retaining the freedom of manoeuvre of uncommitted forces.[20] Rear Operations can not be neglected. Commanders are responsible for Deep, Close and Rear Operations within their area of operations.

OPERATIONS OF WAR

21. Freedom of action, exploitation of tactical opportunities, risk, tempo, quick, bold and decisive action are recurring themes of the manoeuvrist approach to operations and the application of combat power. Whether **offensive, defensive** or **delay operations** conducted as Deep, Close or Rear Operations, Military Police support is one of many critical components. This also applies to unique operations and operations in specific environments, which provide additional challenges. A commander's ability to achieve his intent and to establish the desired tempo depends, in part, on effectively executed Military Police support. Military Police staff and commanding officers are responsible to ensure the commander can maintain the chosen tempo through uninterrupted mobility. As such, civilian activities or enemy action attempting to dislocate or disrupt friendly activities must be prevented or controlled.

22. Transitional Phases from one type of operation to another also require movement of forces. Military Police will be required to support units and formations during transitional phases to ensure the required tempo is maintained. Much of the support required is integral to units or formations.

MISSION COMMAND

> *Discipline requires not only policy definition and emphasis in doctrine, training and education, but also a prominent and visible focus in the interests and concerns of the most*

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[20] B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command,* p. 45.

senior leadership.

The Final Report of the Commission of Inquiry into the Deployment of Canadian Forces to Somalia, 30 June 1997

23. Military Police leaders must be responsive to the commander and assist him in maintaining discipline and his freedom of action through the provision of Mobility Support, Security, Detention and Police Operations. Leaders must have a clear understanding of the commander's intent and the designated main effort.

24. **Leadership**. Commanders must inspire a sense of common purpose, unity of effort and provide an achievable aim to ensure success. The challenge to commanders is to form their intent, based on the superior commander's intent, to provide their subordinates with sufficient guidance for upcoming operations. They must provide adequate resources and guidance, but restrain themselves from dictating how tasks are to be performed. In short, they must **trust** their subordinates. Honesty, integrity, loyalty and dedication are some of the characteristics that must be displayed by all leaders, superiors and subordinates alike, for mutual trust to exist. Commanders are responsible for the selection, training, development and guidance of subordinates to ensure they are successful.

25. **Planning**. Military Police staff must obtain a clear statement of intent and guidance from the commander and they must strive to integrate their effort throughout the planning process. The Military Police staff must then ensure operations plans are supportable and that Military Police plans are developed in conjunction with operations plans. Often they will have to be intuitive and imaginative to provide the commander the flexibility required. Commanding officers must act decisively in order to carry out the commander's intent.

26. Throughout his battle procedure, the commander must consider all factors that will enable him to protect his resources. During the estimate process, or the Operation Planning Process (OPP) at formation level, commanding officers and commanders will be required to accept risks and possibly place greater emphasis on some

factors to the detriment of others in order to achieve his aim. The commander must always be advised of the risks associated with options and course of action development, because only he has the authority to determine what risks he is ready to accept. The battle procedure and the tools of the battle procedure are explained in *Command.*[21]

SECTION 3
CHALLENGES TO MILITARY POLICE

27. Historically, many aspects of warfare have remained unchanged. This is probably due to unaltered factors, such as the chaos of war and the uncertainty of conflict. Doctrine authors have changed terminology in attempts to better explain concepts and differences between allies from the Second World War to the end of the Cold War. However, Canadian doctrine has virtually remained unaltered. Future trends in development of doctrine and procedures must consider the advent of the information age, the integration and interoperability of forces, as well as the emphasis on operations other than war. commanders and commanding officers will face these new challenges and many others in the future; they must attempt to foresee changes and act upon them instead of being forced to react to them. Changes such as the asymmetric conflict versus the conventional conflict discussed in recent studies merit the attention of professional officers to better prepare for the future.

INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY

28. The arrival of the information age has impacted on all aspects of warfare. Greater reliance will be placed on more proficient weapons, equipment and communications systems. This will result in fewer soldiers and units occupying more ground on the battlefield, longer lines of communications and an enhanced tempo. This clearly demonstrates the added importance of each and every soldier, piece of equipment and weapon system. Military Police are not immune to

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[21] B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command,* Chapter 6.

these changes. Efforts enabling the commander to maintain the desired tempo is critical and all units must:

a. Be responsive to commanders by quickly and effectively reassigning limited resources where and when they are most required. To that effect, Military Police must possess the skills and sufficient knowledge to adapt quickly and swiftly to a variety of tasks. They must be assigned judiciously to cope with the pace of the operation.

b. Be appropriately structured and equipped to meet the demand.

c. Use effective planning tools and experience in forecasting requirements.

29. The advent of the information age has provided enhanced communications tools to the armed forces, as well as to the civilian community. These communication assets are being extensively used to communicate internationally the information gathered in theatre. Soldiers and units have the ability to freely communicate information, but of prime concern to the Army is the news media. They exist, they have an important role and they are here to stay. We must accommodate the news media and learn to operate in their presence. They are the first link between fighting forces and the public to which we are accountable. They will report our successes as well as our failures. Honesty and a good rapport with media reporters are essential; anything else will seriously harm the credibility of the Army.

INTEGRATION AND INTEROPERABILITY

30. The integration of forces and interoperability amongst allies now prevails. The Canadian army recognizes that operations outside of Canada will invariably be as part of a combined operation.[22] The

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[22] B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct Of Land Operations—Operational Level*

Army also acknowledges that success in operations requires integration with the airforce and navy; hence, it will usually participate in joint operations. Across the spectrum of conflict and throughout the continuum of operations, the requirement for Military Police units to operate in combined and joint forces is recognized and accepted. The development of co-operative efforts and common procedures must continue. These efforts must be practised in joint and combined operations training. Implementation of multinational support agreements is now common practice amongst nations. The preparation of *NATO Military Police Doctrine and Procedures*[23] reflects a common will amongst allies to gain a better understanding of capabilities and to standardize Military Police support to operations. Host nation support, in-country resources and civil-military co-operation[24] arrangements are also commonly agreed upon to support of forces in multinational operations. Unity of effort in combined operations is important, and the maximum exploitation of available Military Police units must be made via mutual agreements achieved through effective liaison and co-operation. Occasionally, support provided by allied or coalition members may be embedded in operations, such as is usually the case in United Nations (UN) peacekeeping operations. At times this will be considered valuable; whereas, in other circumstances, it may be considered unwise. A judicious balance between Canadian, multi-national and civilian support must be maintained without restricting the commander's flexibility.

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

31. In recent years there has been an increase in operations other than war. They cover a wide spectrum, including domestic operations,

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Doctrine for the Canadian Army, Chapter 9.

[23] APP-12 *NATO Military Police Doctrine* (Study Draft 1) 10 December 1999.

[24] Civil-Military Co-operation organizations include United Nations Agencies, Non-governmental Organizations, Private Volunteer Organizations and other organizations.

peace-support operations and humanitarian operations. However, they may be broken down into three categories: those in which Canada is a participant, either through choice or necessity; those in which Canada is a third party to the conflict; and those where unarmed assistance is provided. The aim in operations other than war is normally to seek de-escalation by controlling and preventing physical violence. Other aims seek to create a secure environment that will permit others to pursue long term diplomatic and/or political solutions that will be acceptable to the belligerent communities. In conflicts other than war, the desired end-state is normally achieved through negotiation.[25]

32. Military Police will usually provide some forces for these types of operations. Their law enforcement skills are well suited to perform tasks demanding negotiating conflict resolution skills and experience. There has been an increase in demand for Military Police during operations other than war and it is expected that this trend will continue. The variety of tasks now assigned to Military Police has increased since the end of the Cold War. As a consequence, Military Police require additional training to fulfil these added responsibilities. They will also have to share their peace officer related knowledge with the remainder of the force to enhance success.

33. During operations, especially peace support operations, the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit may not be deployed and Army Military Police may be required to accomplish some operational level tasks.

SECTION 4
SUMMARY

34. Soldiers empowered with current doctrine, provided excellent training, resources and procedures will lead the Army to success. Military Police are an integral part of the Army and must participate in all types of operations throughout the spectrum of conflict and in each phase of conflict. They assist commanders at all times through the

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[25] B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct Of Land Operations—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, Chapter 10.

provision of Mobility Support, Security, Detention and Police Operations. They must be adequately trained to provide the professional support expected of them.

35. The manoeuvrist approach to operations is a mindset. Commanders seek to react faster than their foes in order to mass friendly strengths against enemy weaknesses. The designation of a main effort and the use of synchronization and tempo generate combat power through the integration of the six combat functions. Protection, which includes Military Police, is one of the six combat functions, which are all inextricably linked to one another. Success can only be achieved through efficient integration of all functions. Effective Military Police support assists the commander in positioning his force in an advantageous position vis-à-vis his opponent. Efforts must be synchronized to ensure forces receive the required support to concentrate on the main effort, at the tempo desired by the commander, in order to achieve the desired end-state. Commanders must trust their subordinates to achieve the tasks assigned and be provided the flexibility to determine how they can best achieve success.

36. Trends that have emerged since the end of the Cold War and lead us into the 21st century provide Military Police with new challenges. Information technology will allow greater speed and longer lines of communication, enhancing the importance of Mobility Support Operations. Integration and interoperability has now become the norm forcing military force to operate efficiently in joint and combined operations as well as with civilians. New tasks and added importance to Military Police support has been, and will continue to be, required in operations other than war. Military Police must quickly and professionally face these new challenges.

CHAPTER 2
EMPLOYMENT OF MILITARY POLICE

Discipline is the soul of an army. It makes small numbers formidable, procures success to the weak, and esteem to all.

General George Washington, 29 July 1759

SECTION 1
GENERAL

1. Assisting with discipline on the route network, advising on discipline with respect to security and assisting our commanders in maintaining discipline is a succinct description of the duties of Military Police. Discipline is an essential component of leadership necessary of all units to achieve a high level of cohesiveness. Respect of Military Police soldiers is essential for them to be successful in the accomplishment of their duties. They must earn and maintain the respect of every soldier in the unit and formation they support by being courteous, helpful and professional at all times.

2. In a close military community, observance of such values as honesty and loyalty based on self-discipline, personal and professional integrity and adherence to both military and civilian law plays a crucial role in the maintenance of military discipline and morale. All commanders have a critical role in setting and maintaining the ethical climate of their commands, a climate that must be robust enough to withstand the pressures of both peacetime and operational soldiering.[26] The Military Police soldier, in support of the commander, must, as a minimum, display the same values (if not surpass them) and set an example.

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[26] B-GL-300-003/FP-000 *Command*, p. 19.

PRINCIPLES OF EMPLOYMENT

3. There will rarely be enough Military Police for the tasks that are assigned by formations. Therefore, the employment of highly mobile Military Police patrols with effective communication should be based on the principles of centralized control, flexibility, economy of effort, decentralized execution and co-operation.

4. The following principles of employment should be considered:

a. **Centralized Control**. To optimize the Military Police's overall contribution to operations, they will usually be controlled centrally. To fulfil priority tasks as assigned by a commander in an ever changing and rapid battlefield, careful consideration should be given before detaching Military Police from it's formation. When doing so, the command relationship assigned to Military Police units and sub-units should be carefully considered.

b. **Flexibility**. Military Police sub-units are easier to integrate in the formation plan when retained under operational command of the formation Military Police unit. This facilitates the reallocation of Military Police resources to suit ever-changing priorities on the battlefield.

c. **Economy of Effort**. Limited resources require that Military Police be allocated to the highest priority task and that, when possible, tasks be combined. Efforts must be made to avoid a duplication of effort. Although desirable, Military Police will probably not be able to maintain an uncommitted reserve. When efforts to prioritize and combine tasks have been exhausted, support for higher level Military Police units will have to be sought.

d. **Co-operation**. "Co-operation with local units will do much to create mutual trust, and make the job of policing more pleasant."[27] Although this statement was written in 1957, it holds to be true and has endured the test of time. Co-operation amongst units will contribute to the cohesiveness of a formation and the desired esprit-de-corps. Unified action at all levels of command and co-operation with our allies, governmental and non-governmental agencies and with civilians is necessary to succeed. Military Police units and sub-units form an integral part of formations and units and provide each other mutual support. All Army soldiers and units strive to succeed as a cohesive group—including its integral Military Police unit.

5. Military Police possess the following characteristics, which provide enhances command and control in operations:

a. **Mobility**. To fulfil their tasks Military Police must be capable to react quickly to orders and be redirected due to changes in priorities or conditions during operations.

b. **Communications**. Higher level decisions may be based on information reported by a single Military Police patrol. Therefore, to be of value, information must always be timely and accurate. Formation plans are not immutable and will change with the situation, requiring Military Police to adjust plans to execute orders. Integral communications equipment must allow communication to flow within Military Police units and with formation headquarters.

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[27] CAMT 10-1 1957 *Canadian Army Manual of Training Provost Duties*, p. 1

SECTION 2
POLICE PROFESSIONALISM

POLICE ACCOUNTABILITY FRAMEWORK



Figure 2-1: The Thunderbird

6. Commanders and their senior Military Police advisors must ensure the provision of a professional and effective police service. Both are accountable for their actions (or lack thereof) and are subject to audit, investigation and, if necessary, administrative or disciplinary action. A signed Police Accountability Framework developed by the commander and his senior Military Police advisor will detail respective responsibilities and roles as they apply to policing, and will ensure these are clearly understood.[28]

7. The primacy of operations and the need for independence in police operations are fundamental. Competing interests and priorities must be balanced and addressed in a harmonious manner without sacrificing either the integrity of police operations or the operational requirements of the commander. This formal relationship underscores

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[28] A-SJ-100-004/AG-000 *Canadian Forces Military Police Policies and Technical Procedures*, Chapter 1, Annex C, provides additional information on the contents of an Accountability Framework.

the respective obligations of the commander and the senior Military Police advisor. It also serves to educate and protect both parties, given the formal audit and complaints investigative processes that could occur should either party not fulfil their responsibilities. The relationship assists in building understanding, trust and teamwork.

8. The Senior Military Police Advisor is responsive to the commander's needs and is accountable to the commander for the results achieved. Commanders establish general policing priorities and objectives, assign missions and allocate resources. Compliance with police, custodial and protective security procedures is audited in accordance with the Canadian Forces Provost Marshall (CFPM) Audit Program.[29]

PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT

> *After the organization of troops, military discipline is the first matter that presents itself. It is the soul of armies. If it is not established with wisdom and maintained with unshakeable resolution you will have no soldiers. Regiments and armies will only be contemptible, armed mobs, more dangerous to their own country than to the enemy...*
>
> **Maurice de Saxe, *Mes Rêveries*, 1732**

9. Military Police are professional soldiers and Specially Appointed Persons/peace officers; as such, they must abide by the codes of conduct established by both professions.

a. **The Code of Conduct for the Canadian Forces**. The law of armed conflict applies to all military forces. It is a means by which the use of violence during conflict is regulated. The *Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level*[30] is the Canadian Forces reference document, which must be read and understood by all leaders and applied throughout the spectrum of conflict, except for domestic operations during which Canadian law apply. *The Code of Conduct for Canadian Forces Personnel*[31] provides the eleven basic rules all soldiers will abide by in operations. Both of these manuals specifically discuss the use of force and, of particular interest to Military Police, the treatment of prisoners of war and civilians is explained in detail. Additionally, *The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949* as well as *The Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949* also provide international standards that must be respected at all time. Military Police have the same responsibility as every soldier and officer to prevent and report violations of the law. Additionally, Military Police could be mandated to investigate some of these offences.

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[29] A-SJ-100-004/AG-000 *Canadian Forces Military Police Policies and Technical Procedures*, Chapter 12, CFPM Audit Program.

b. **Military Police Professional Code of Conduct**. The *National Defence Act* authorized the establishment of a professional code of conduct applicable to Military Police, similar to codes of conduct applicable to most Canadian civilian police forces. Military Police shall carry out their policing duties in accordance with the law enforcement standards and Military Police procedures set out in applicable legislation, regulations and orders. They shall, at all times, conduct themselves in a manner that upholds the reputation of the Canadian Forces and the Military Police profession. Any member of the Military Police who breaches the *Military Police Professional Code of Conduct* [32] will face an internal review for the purpose of assessing if Military Police credentials should be restricted or revoked. The Canadian Forces Provost Marshal establishes policy and procedures of the Military Police Credentials Board[33] in accordance with *Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces.*[34]

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[30] B-GG-005-027/AF-020 *The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level.*

[31] B-GG-005-027/AF-022 *The Code of Conduct for Canadian Forces Personnel.*

COMPLAINTS

10. The *National Defence Act* establishes a Military Police Complaints Commission[35] in order to provide for greater public accountability by the Military Police and the chain of command in relation to Military Police investigations. Any person can lodge a complaint about the conduct of a member of the Military Police appointed pursuant to section 156 of the *National Defence Act* and engaged in policing duties.[36] A member of the Military Police conducting or supervising an investigation is permitted to complain about improper interference encountered in the conduct of an investigation.[37]

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[32] *National Defence Act* 13.1 and *Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces* 22.

[33] A-SJ-100-004/AG-000 *Canadian Forces Military Police Policies and Technical Procedures,* Chapter 3 Military Police Credentials and Military Police Code of Conduct.

[34] *Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces* 22.04—Military Police Credentials Review Board.

[35] *National Defence Act*, Section 250.1.

[36] *National Defence Act*, Section 250.18 (1).

[37] *National Defence Act*, Section 250.19 (1).

11. Subject to the consent of the complainant and the person who is the subject of the complaint, the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal may attempt, when permitted by regulations, to resolve conduct complaints informally.[38] Military Police will abide by established procedures to process complaints, report complaints and conduct informal resolutions.[39]

12. Military Police must ensure accurate guidance is provided to anyone seeking information on procedures to lodge a complaint.

SECTION 3
ROLE, CONCEPT AND FUNCTIONS

ROLE OF MILITARY POLICE

13. The role of Military Police is to provide commanders with an essential element of command and control, through the conduct of four functions: Mobility Support, Security, Detention, and Police Operations.

14. The conduct of four functions—Mobility Support, Security, Detention and Police Operations—satisfies the demands of the Military Police role. The functions are introduced following the concept of employment.

15. A Military Police Function Matrix, which provides a breakdown of Military Police functions and subordinate tasks, is found at Annex A. It delineates the responsibilities of the strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict for each task.

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[38] *National Defence Act*, Section 250.27 (1).

[39] Procedures are detailed in A-SJ-100-004/AG-000 *Canadian Forces Military Police Policies and Technical Procedures*, Chapter 13.

CONCEPT OF EMPLOYMENT

16. Based on the principles of employment and in keeping with the manoeuvrist approach to operations, Military Police provide essential integral support to units. This includes centralized close support to formations as far forward as possible and centralized general support further away from combat activities in the area of operations. Military Police units will not be able to perform all tasks simultaneously; therefore, their tasks must be prioritized by the Provost Marshal and approved by the commander.

17. On the battlefield, Military Police units will locate themselves near the area in which they must operate. Military Police providing close support will usually be as far forward as possible behind manoeuvre units. Elements providing general support will usually be located in the Brigade or Division Support Area. Regimental Police (RP) are usually located in the F echelon with the unit headquarters.

18. Canadian doctrine distinguishes between three levels of conflict: strategic, operational and tactical. The success of the Military Police support to operations is dependent on the successful integration of Military Police activities at these three levels. Police and Detention Operations are the responsibilities of the Canadian Forces and can not generally be devolved to allied formation Military Police. Although co-operation with those forces will be sought and multi-national units established, Canadian Military Police units or detachments would usually conduct these activities. Mobility Support and Security Operations must be coordinated to provide efficiency and economy.

19. Operational level Military Police units will usually deploy in theatre before tactical level Military Police units. During the warning, preparation, deployment and redeployment phases, Base/Wing/ Garrison Military Police will support units and formations, including Military Police units. During the employment phase Military Police across Canada will also provide the support required for soldiers returning home or those preparing for deployment. The support required is indicated at Annex A.

4. The purpose of this manual is to establish the doctrinal basis for the provision of Military Police support to tactical units and formations of the Canadian army

FUNCTIONS

20. **Mobility Support Operations**. Military Police support the commander by ensuring an uninterrupted flow of traffic within his area of operation. Efficient traffic movement, enforcement of traffic regulations, straggler, population movement and potentially Nuclear, Biological and Chemical (NBC) monitoring all enhance mobility on the traffic network.

21. Generally, Military Police assist in the control of tactical formation movements. The Provost Marshal will assist the G3 staff with planning tactical movements and may prepare Movement Orders or Annexes on behalf of the G3. At unit level Military Police provide limited support to the commanding officers and seek formation Military Police support when additional support is required.

22. **Security Operations**. Military Police support the commander by ensuring a more secure environment for units and soldiers by protecting these forces from hostile intelligence services and the criminal threat. The implementation of efficient security measures, before and during operations will provide the commander with an important tactical advantage.

23. Security measures are a command responsibility and the Military Police, usually through Provost Marshal, provide advice, assist in planning and ensuring a high level of protective security necessary to succeed in operations. This is intended to allow soldiers and units to operate in a protected and secure environment.

24. **Detention Operations**. Military Police support the commander by ensuring soldiers ordered into service custody are held in adequate facilities supervised by Military Police in accordance with regulations. Military Police soldiers also handle civilian detainees legally apprehended within a Canadian area of operation.

25. Immediately after capture, prisoners of war should be supervised by Military Police arrangements for their evacuation. This should be away from immediate combat and will promptly be coordinated. Military Police will ensure prisoners of war are treated in accordance with the *Geneva Conventions*. This will relieve the

4. The purpose of this manual is to establish the doctrinal basis for the provision of Military Police support to tactical units and formations of the Canadian army

administrative burden on commanding officers and commanders enabling them to focus on continuing operations.

26. **Police Operations**. Military Police support the commander by ensuring a high standard of discipline is maintained. Military Police units assist in maintaining discipline by establishing crime prevention programs, conducting law enforcement activities and investigating offences.

27. At the tactical level, Police Operations will invariably be more intensive during the pre- and post- hostility phases. When conducting Police Operations, Military Police will focus on crime prevention, rather than crime enforcement through the application of laws and regulations. In areas away from combat such as is the case in periods of rest and recreation, crime prevention will be the focus of Military Police. Military Police units and the Provost Marshal, in co-operation with unit commanding officers and formation commanders, will establish a crime prevention program in order to maintain discipline rather than having to impose it. Military Police and all commanders must work together to ensure Canadian soldiers maintain the excellent level of discipline for which they are recognized.

SECTION 4
EMPLOYMENT OF TACTICAL LEVEL MILITARY POLICE

THE CONTINUUM OF OPERATIONS


Conditions
PEACE
CONFLICT
WAR
Operations Other than War
Warfighting
Strategic
Military
Response
Non-Combat Operations
Combat Operations
Operational
Military
Means

Figure 2-2: The Continuum of Operations Superimposed on the Spectrum of Conflict

28. The continuum of operations embraces the concept of combat and non-combat operations. Combat operations are military operations where the use or threatened use of force is essential to accomplish a mission. Non-Combat operations are defined as military operations where weapons may be present; but their use is primarily for self-defence purposes and is controlled by established rules of engagement.

29. Note that legal considerations[40] vary dependant on the geographic location of operations. International law[41] is the primary legal basis for the use of force during international operations. Additional agreements and, if applicable, UN resolutions govern the use of force. During domestic operations, Canadian domestic laws apply to all Canadian Force members. During all operations, Rules of Engagement[42] will be provided to control the use of force during all types of operations.

30. Jurisdictions specific to Military Police for the exercise of their peace officer duties are detailed in Chapter 6, Section 1.

31. During all operations Military Police fulfil the full gamut of tasks assigned. Prior to formations engaging in operations, Military Police will focus their efforts on preparing the formation by executing Security Operations tasks. Military Police will ensure a high level of discipline by executing Police Operations, custody and detainee tasks. As a general rule, for each of the types of operations described below, employment of Military Police will focus on the various functions or tasks listed.

WARFIGHTING

32. During warfighting, Military Police will usually remain behind the lead manoeuvre units. The lack of armoured protection prevents Military Police patrols to operate forward. Reconnaissance units, when available, are usually tasked to provide mobility support to forward manoeuvre units.

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[40] B-GG-005-004/AF-000, *Canadian Forces Operations,* Chapter 5, "The Use of Force in CF Operations" provides fundamental principles and concepts on the use of force during international or domestic operations.

[41] B-GG-005-027/AF-020 *The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level.*

[42] B-GG-005-004/AF-005 *The Use of Force in CF Operations* provides direction for the development of rules of engagement.

33. **Offensive Operations**. During offensive operations, Military Police will conduct:

a. Mobility support on approach routes for preliminary movement of manoeuvre forces to their assembly areas.

b. Mobility support, usually on two main axis of advance. This support is from the rear of the lead Battle Groups on the attack to enable the remainder of the formation to provide continuous support to the lead manoeuvre unit. Movement priorities will be strictly enforced.

c. Mobility support for sustainment activities in the Brigade/Division Support Area.

d. Prisoner of war tasks.

34. **Defensive Operations**. During defensive operations, Military Police will conduct:

a. mobility support behind the main defence area to support the reserve on counter-move routes into the main defence area;

b. mobility support on the main supply routes;

c. mobility support for special replenishment activities;

d. Rear Area Security tasks in the Brigade/Division Support Area; and

e. limited prisoner of war tasks.

35. **Delay Operations**. During delay operations, Military Police will conduct:

a. mobility support behind the main defence area to support the reserve on counter-move routes into the main defence area;

b. mobility support at crossing sites and critical points along axis required for rearward movements;

c. mobility support for special replenishment activities; and

d. prisoner of war tasks.

36. **Transitional Phases**. The offence, defence and delay operations are linked by one or more transitional phases, as listed below. Fluid movement during the transitional phases is essential for manoeuvre units to retain the tempo. Military Police will provide support during the following transitional phases:

a. **Advance to Contact**. During the advance to contact, Military Police will conduct:

(1) Mobility support is usually on two main axis of advance from the rear of the lead battle groups of the main body. This is to enable the remainder of the formation to provide continuous support to the lead manoeuvre unit. On contact with the enemy, Military Police will remain rear of rear Battle Groups.

(2) Rear Area Security tasks in the Brigade/Division Support Area.

(3) Prisoner of war tasks.

b. **Meeting Engagement**. During meeting engagements, Military Police will conduct:

(1) Mobility support on two main axis of advance behind the rear Battle Groups to enable the remainder of the formation to provide continuous support to the lead manoeuvre unit.

(2) Mobility support to rear manoeuvre unit on routes moving into an attack. Support is provided behind units in contact.

(3) Prisoner of war tasks.

c. **Link-up**. A link-up between two forces engaged in converging attacks may take place when each force captures the adjacent objectives allocated. In such cases, reconnaissance forces will establish contact with the other force and provide mobility support forward assisted by engineers clearing routes. Military Police will provide mobility support for follow-on forces as in offensive operations or the advance to contact.

d. **Withdrawal**. During the withdrawal, Military Police will conduct:

(1) mobility support for the rearward movement of forces not required for immediate operations, including support services elements and wounded; and

(2) mobility support of rearward movement of the main body at critical junctions and potential defiles.

e. **Relief**. During relief, Military Police will conduct:

(1) Mobility support for a relief in place, ensuring rapid movement on separate routes for traffic travelling in opposite directions and, if possible, separate routes for wheeled and tracked vehicles.

Movement on lateral routes will be avoided.

(2) Mobility support during forward passage of lines. The incoming force will have priority for movement. A traffic control office will usually be established with a Regulating Headquarters. The in-place force will provide traffic control within the area of operations and the moving force will provide assistance. The order of march will generally be reconnaissance elements, followed by combat support units (which may have to move early in order to support the move of the manoeuvre units), followed by the manoeuvre units.

(3) Mobility support for rearward passage of lines. A traffic control office will usually be established with a Regulating Headquarters. The moving formation must have priority on an adequate number of roads to ensure its rapid movement through the defended area. Control of movement to the rear of the handover line is the responsibility of the in-place force. The number of routes back should be considered against the requirements for dispersion and the need to close routes to improve the barrier plan effectiveness. The first elements to move will normally be support services units.

(4) Mobility support during a retirement is similar to the withdrawal except that the manoeuvre units are out of contact.

OPERATIONS OTHER THAN WAR

37. **Peace Support Operations**:

a. Peacekeeping operations are generally undertaken under Chapter VI of the UN Charter and are conducted with the consent of all parties to a conflict to monitor and facilitate the implementation of a peace agreement.

b. Peace enforcement operations are undertaken under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. They are coercive in nature and are conducted when the consent of all parties to the conflict has not been achieved or might be uncertain. They are designed to maintain or re-establish peace or enforce the terms specified in the mandate.

c. Peacemaking covers the diplomatic activities conducted after the commencement of a conflict aimed at establishing a cease-fire or a rapid peaceful settlement. They can include the provision of good offices, mediation, conciliation and such actions as diplomatic pressure, isolation or sanctions.

d. Peace building covers actions that support political, economic, social and military measures. It facilitates the establishment of structures aiming to strengthen and solidify political settlements in order to redress the causes of conflict. This includes mechanisms to identify and support structures that tend to consolidate peace, advance a sense of confidence and well-being and support economic reconstruction.

e. Humanitarian operations are conducted to alleviate human suffering. Humanitarian operations may precede or accompany humanitarian activities provided by specialized civilian organizations. Humanitarian operations may be conducted in non-peace support operations scenarios.

38. Traditionally, the Canadian army has deployed battle groups or battalions to peace support operations with a National Command Element and supporting units. Regimental Police, usually augmented

during these operations, provide support within their unit area of operation. Often, Military Police have been assigned OPCOM of a United Nations Military Police Unit. Canadian Military Police are usually in the Canadian area of operation but may be deployed outside this area. The guidelines listed for Combined Forces Military Police in Section 5 of this chapter will usually form the basis of coalition or UN operations.

39. During peace support operations, Military Police continue to provide support to their units/formation in accordance with the doctrine contained herein.

40. During peacekeeping operations, most of the Military Police tasks are those of police operations. Mobility support, security and detention operation tasks must also be conducted. Commanders, in the past, have also tasked Military Police with additional responsibilities. These included surveillance of high profile groups, negotiation at checkpoints and confiscation of weapons. Military Police should expect these additional tasks given their training and the additional respect police tend to elicit from civilians.

41. During peacemaking operations, Military Police tasks will include the full range of tasks describe in this manual with emphasis on Mobility Support Operations for tactical level Military Police units.

42. During peace building operations, Military Police tasks will usually involve United Nation Military Police Units in assisting civil police forces by the provision of advice and training.

43. **Domestic Operations**. The Canadian Forces can be called upon to assist in response to requests from Canadian civil authorities. Domestic operations may require assistance from the Canadian Forces through the provision of humanitarian assistance, assistance to law enforcement, aid of the civil power and requests emanating from the Emergencies Act. Military Police are often requested to provide information regarding the support available from the Canadian Forces.

Senior Military Police Advisors should be familiar with the approval process for domestic operations.[43]

44. Joint and Land Force Military Police doctrine, continues to apply during domestic operations. During such operations, Military Police continue to provide support to their units/formation in accordance with this doctrine and are not employed to replace or augment civil police forces. Persons, other than Military Police, may be granted peace officer status only during the time they are performing duties related to law enforcement. The Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit is responsible for police and security liaison.

45. Regulations[44] and direction[45] for security of defence establishments—including Canadian Forces property, equipment and personnel—continue to apply. Security levels may be increased consistent with the assessment of the threat.

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[43] NDHQ Instructions DCDS 2/98, *Guidance for the Conduct of Domestic Operations* should be used as the primary reference.

[44] *Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces,* Volume 4, Appendix 3.2, Defence Controlled Access Area Regulations.

[45] A-SJ-100-001/AS-001 *National Defence Security Instructions.*

SECTION 5
MILITARY POLICE UNITS


Alliance HQ
NDHQ
DCDS
VCDS
J3
J2
CFPM
J3 MP
J2 Plans & Pol 4
CO NIS
Strategic Level
CO NCIU
Theatre HQ
NCE HQ
Theatre PM
Operational Level
NCE PM
CFNCIU Det
MPU
CFNIS Det
Corps HQ
Corps PM
Tactical Level
Corps MP Unit
Canadian Division
CMBG
PM
CO MP Unit
MP Unit
MP Unit

- The NCE retains Full Comd of all Canadian Units
- The CFPM retains technical control of all Canadian Military Police Units and Provost Marshals activities pertaining to Police Operations.
- The CO NIS retains Full Comd of the NIS Det

Figure 2-3: Levels of Military Police Support

46. The Canadian army recognizes that operations outside of Canada will invariably be as part of a combined operation.[46] The *Canadian Land Force Electronic Battle Box*,[47] which provides doctrinally sound structures for the Canadian army, is based on an Allied Corps. Operational level units, major equipment and personnel quantities are also depicted in the *Canadian Land Force Electronic Battle Box.* When doctrinally sound structures are required, for force planning or training purposes, the planners and the training institutions should utilize this electronic document.

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[46] B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct Of Land Operations—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army,* Chapter 9.

[47] B-GL-331-005/FP-001 *Canadian Land Force Electronic Battle Box.*

47. Doctrinal structures are reviewed on a regular basis. Peacetime structures are usually restricted to reflect economic realities and the structures of units deployed will inevitably be task-tailored to meet mission specific requirements. This manual will therefore not depict any structure but will be limited to general descriptions of Military Police units within the Canadian army.

TACTICAL LEVEL ARMY MILITARY POLICE UNITS



Figure 2-4: Unknown (yellow), Friendly (blue), Neutral (green) and Hostile (red) MP Unit

48. **Regimental Police**. Major units with Regimental Police will often have a section composed of Military Policemen and soldiers appointed as Regimental Policemen. This arrangement of resources is usually advantageous to units but it must be noted that although Regimental Policemen have sufficient resources only few have the requisite powers to accomplish all Police Operations. Regimental Police provide integral support to their unit necessary for operations and to support the commanding officer to maintain discipline. Discretion in the conduct of Police Operations, within the confine of law, enables Regimental Sergeant Majors and commanding officers to handle discipline matters within the unit where it is most effective. The Sergeant in charge of the Regimental Police section is a Military Policeman. He is accountable to his commanding officer and is bound by the Military Police Code of Conduct. During Police Operations he will remain under the technical control of the formation Military Police unit commanding officer/Provost Marshal. When in operations, if the unit is not provided additional support by a higher level Canadian Military Police unit, the Regimental Police section will be commanded by a Warrant Officer who will also assume the responsibilities of the Senior Military Police Advisor.

49. **The Military Police Section**. The basic building block for structuring Military Police units and their employment is the section. To provide flexibility a twelve-man section is most effective and is the norm. A Sergeant commands the section. When in operations, if the section is not part of a larger Canadian Military Police unit, a Warrant Officer or a Captain will command all Military Police and assume the responsibilities of the Senior Military Police Advisor. When two or more sections are combined, a Military Police Platoon is formed and is commanded by a Canadian or allied Military Police Captain.

50. **Formation Military Police units**. The Military Police unit in a Brigade Group or Division must be capable of fulfilling all close support and general support tasks as listed at Annex A, in addition to providing integral support to formation troops without Military Police resources. The divisional Military Police unit is usually composed of a sub-unit to support formation troops and an additional sub-unit for each brigade. The *Canadian Land Forces Electronic Battle Box* provides the optimal resources in personnel and equipment, to fulfil the various Military Police tasks. Not all tasks are performed simultaneously; therefore, the structures provide for a typical environment with a normal employment rate. The tempo will increase and decrease and Military Police resources will not always be sufficient, priorities will have to be established. Military Police sub-units may be placed OPCON, TACOM or TACON to subordinate formations or other formation units when it is determined that decentralized control is advantageous to the formation.

51. Divisions and Brigade Groups may obtain additional support from allied Military Police units or from corps Military Police assets.

OPERATIONAL LEVEL MILITARY POLICE UNITS

52. **The Military Police Support in Echelons Above Corps Level**. Allied Military Police units, combined Military Police units, the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit and the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service will provide additional support beyond the capabilities of formation resources, during international operations. Canadian Military Police units and civilian police force will provide assistance during domestic operations.

53. **The Canadian Forces Military Police Unit**. The Canadian Forces Military Police Unit provides support to the Canadian Navy, Air Force and Army in the theatre of operation. The size and structure of the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit will vary for every operation. The Canadian Forces Military Police Unit provides the Army with operational level support as depicted at Annex A and as described in the subsequent chapters. At times, the support of the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit will not be available and essential tasks will have to be completed by Army Military Police. The Canadian Forces Military Police Unit will provide limited support to Army formation and units when the support of Army Military Police is not available.



Figure 2-5: Friendly (blue) Law Enforcement Unit

54. **Canadian Forces National Investigation Service**. The Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (NIS), a Military Police unit of the Canadian Forces, has been established to provide specialized, independent and professional investigative services to the Canadian Forces on a national and international basis. The NIS will provide all investigative services for serious or sensitive matters or matters that require complex or specialized investigation. The NIS will normally investigate all indictable/hybrid offences of a serious and sensitive nature as mandated by Deputy Provost Marshal (DPM) Police. They will also provide investigative assistance when requested or when tasked. Details on the responsibilities of the NIS can be found in Section 4 of Chapter 6. The detachment of the NIS will usually be OPCON to the Joint Task Force Provost Marshal but will always remain under full command of the CFPM.



Figure 2-6: Friendly (blue) Counter-Intelligence Unit

55. **Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit**. The Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit will conduct investigations with the aim of identifying security vulnerabilities, and / or assess the extent of any damage which may have resulted from security incidents. The Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit does not normally conduct investigations that will result in criminal or administrative prosecution. During international operations the Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit will deploy a detachment OPCOM to the Canadian National Commander and during domestic operation a detachment will be OPCON to the operational level commander. The Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit functions include:

a. identifying, investigating and countering the threat posed to the Canadian Forces and the Department of National Defence by espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism;

b. conducting police and security liaison in support of the Canadian Forces preparation for and during domestic operations;

c. providing security briefings and debriefings; and

d. providing counter-intelligence support to the Canadian Forces.



Figure 2-7: NATO Combined Military Police

56. **The Combined Forces Military Police**. Military Police are often placed under operational control of multinational Military Police units. This is particularly true of operations other than war where NATO, UN and coalition forces combine their efforts for economy of effort and the potential advantages of having several nations joining efforts. APP-12 *NATO Military Police Doctrine and Procedures* and STANAG 2085 *NATO Combined Military Police* detail the guidelines agreed upon for the employment of Military Police in NATO operations. These guidelines will usually form the basis of coalition or UN operations. The agreement for the employment of NATO Combined Military Police, in general terms, states the following:

a. A chief of the NATO combined Military Police, usually assigned from the receiving nation, will be appointed.

b. The NATO combined Military Police will be divided into detachments usually commanded by a Military Police of the receiving nation.

c. The Senior Canadian Military Police Advisor will be responsible for command and discipline of subordinate Canadian Military Police.

d. The National Defence Act, Canadian laws, and other agreements such as the NATO-SOFA[48] will be enforced by Canadian Military Police. The Status of Force Agreement states in part:

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[48] Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces, Volume 4, Appendix 2.4 *Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces* has been reproduced at Annex C. A SOFA, similar to that reproduced at Annex C, may be developed for specific

(1) Regularly constituted military units or formations of a force shall have the right to police any camps, establishments or other premises that they occupy as the result of an agreement with the receiving State. The Military Police of the force may take all appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security on such premises.

(2) Outside these premises, such Military Police shall be employed only subject to arrangements with the authorities of the receiving state and in liaison with those authorities. The employment will only be as much as is necessary to maintain discipline and order among the members of the force.

e. Canadian soldiers may be detained by the NATO Combined Military Police of the Host Nation. Canadian Military Police will be notified.

f. Canadian soldiers may be interviewed by Canadian Military Police or the Military Police of the receiving nation belonging to the NATO Combined Military Police.

g. Military Police Reports shall be sent to the Commander of the NATO Combined Military Police who will forward it to DPM Police via the Canadian Provost Marshal in theatre; and

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operations involving non-NATO nations.

h. Military Police members will cooperate and assist each other on request.

57. A technical arrangement for the enforcement of discipline and the conduct of investigations in multinational operations is contained within APP-12 *NATO Military Police Doctrine and Procedures*. This arrangement, when agreed upon, is used when investigations involve persons from a nation other than that of the investigator. Prior to deployment in multinational operations, the Senior Canadian Military Police Advisor should consult this document.

58. The Senior Military Police Advisor assigned to multinational units should ensure STANAG 2085, national orders and the instructions issued by the J3 MP[49] are understood by the Canadian commanders responsible for an area of operations. Responsibilities and limitations with respect to Military Police jurisdiction and powers over Canadian, allied soldiers and civilians must be understood by the Canadian chain of command. Details on jurisdiction of Military Police are described in Chapter 6, Section 1.



Figure 2-8: Friendly (blue) Civilian Law Enforcement

59. **The Civilian Police Forces**. During the course of many Military Police tasks the co-operation of the civilian police forces will prove to be beneficial. Close liaison must be maintained with local civilian police forces. Their knowledge of the local area, the route network and the local populace will not only save Military Police time

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[49] The Canadian Forces Provost Marshal is NDHQ J3 MP.

and effort, but will also improve efficiency. Liaison with all police forces is an essential component of Military Police duties in all environments.

60. **Other Law Enforcement Organizations**. As is the case with local police forces, other law enforcement agencies may prove to be of significant assistance to Military Police. Customs, port and airport security police will usually share information and seek Military Police assistance to deal with Canadian units and soldiers.

SECTION 6
SUMMARY

61. Employment of Military Police assets should be based on the principles of centralized control, flexibility, economy of effort, and co-operation. Throughout the spectrum of conflict, Commanders and their Senior Military Police Advisors are accountable for the provision of a professional and effective police service. Military Police are professional soldiers and peace officers who must abide by *the Military Police Professional Code of Conduct* and *The Code of Conduct for the Canadian Forces.*

62. The role of Military Police is to provide commanders with an essential element of command and control, through the conduct of four functions: Mobility Support, Security, Detention, and Police Operations. The provision of Mobility Support, Security, Detention and Police Operations achieve this. A Military Police Function Matrix, found at Annex A, provides a breakdown of Military Police functions and subordinate tasks. Military Police units will not be able to perform all tasks simultaneously; therefore, their tasks must be prioritized. They will provide essential integral support to units, centralized close support to formations as far forward as possible and centralized general support further away from combat activities in the area of operations. Employment of tactical level Military Police throughout the continuum of conflict must focus on the support required by the type of operation. The success of the Military Police Operations is dependent on the successful integration of assets at all levels of military operations.

63. Military Police provide support to combat operations and operations other than war. Prior to formations engaging in operations and during operations other than war, Police and Security Operations are predominant. During combat operations, Mobility Support and prisoner of war tasks consume the majority of Military Police resources.

64. Recognizing that operations outside of Canada will invariably be as part of a combined operation, the Army has structured itself based on an Allied Corps. The basic building block for Military Police is the section. Regimental Police provide integral support to their unit. A Military Police unit supports a formation. The Canadian Forces Military Police Unit or the Canadian Forces National Investigation Service (CFNIS) will provide additional support beyond the capabilities of Division resources. Multinational Military Police units may be formed for economy and co-operation must be sought from civilian police forces and other law enforcement agencies to enhance efficiency.

CHAPTER 3
MOBILITY SUPPORT OPERATIONS

To move swiftly, strike vigorously, and secure the fruits of victory is the secret of successful war.

LGen Thomas Stonewall Jackson, letter 1861

SECTION 1
GENERAL

1. The manoeuvrist approach to operations implies that the area of operation may be more diverse and more fluid than in the past. Mission Command calls for commanders to provide their subordinates greater discretion and flexibility. The results are a non-contiguous battlefield with commanders allowing their subordinates to manoeuvre more freely within their area of operation. Less predictable operations, highly mobile and lethal units usually need to move quickly into combat to be effective. In order to defeat the enemy, it is essential to concentrate overwhelming force at a decisive place and time. It does not necessarily imply a massing of forces, but rather the massing of effects of those forces. This allows a numerically inferior force to achieve decisive results.[50]

2. Military Police support units and ensure resources can be concentrated at the right place at the right time to provide the decisive action. This support is provided through efficient traffic movement, enforcement of traffic regulations, control of stragglers, population movement and (potentially) NBC monitoring. All these activities enhance mobility on the traffic network.

3. The flexibility of Military Police units is essential to provide the formation the capability to respond to changing circumstances. Good communications and effective command and control will enable Military Police to quickly react to changes. This is imperative if a

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[50] B-GL-300-002/FP-000 *Land Force Tactical Doctrine*, p. 1-3.

commander is to retain his freedom of action. **Military Police support operations by enhancing the mobility of troops.**

SECTION 2
ROAD MOVEMENT

FUNDAMENTALS OF ROAD MOVEMENT

4. A moving formation normally controls its own movements within its area of operation. Outside its area of operation, the formation in place usually assists in co-ordination of movement, provide route signing and traffic control. In areas or on routes controlled by higher formations, that formation's traffic control organization or movement control centre usually assigns the movement control responsibility. This ensures prioritization and co-ordination between the various military forces, host nation and civil authorities.

5. All movements require protection, including protection against air attack, achieved through a combination of active and passive measures; dispersal over many routes, camouflage, concealment, and electronic emission control. Air defence elements may move with the force or be located at defiles along the route. Very critical tactical movement of major forces may also be provided with tactical air cover.

6. The movement of vehicles in an area of operations is classified as follows:

   a. **Manoeuvre**. Manoeuvre occurs when in contact with the enemy or when contact is imminent. These movements are planned and executed by manoeuvring units and sub-units.

   b. **Tactical Movement**. Employed when forces, not in contact with the enemy, are moving in an area where there is a risk of attack. These movements are planned and executed by the operations staff.

c. **Administrative Movement**. Movements generally consisting of planned scheduled convoys conducting replenishment and sustainment operations. They are usually planned and executed by the administration staff.

7. Movement of vehicles is controlled by one of the following three methods:

a. **Average Speed and Density**. At night, or at other times if the enemy threat justifies it, columns may move at a set average speed and density. This results in a long stream of vehicles more or less evenly spaced on the road. This method makes for ease of control but is extremely vulnerable to air.

b. **Capacity**. If the enemy situation warrants it, routes can be used to capacity. Routes are analyzed and inspected for their capability to handle a certain number of vehicles per hour. As the enemy threat increases, density will be greatly reduced, longer distances will be maintained, and greater intervals between columns will be necessary. Although speed can be increased, control is then more difficult, but the result will not present a worthwhile target to the enemy.

c. **Packet**. Columns are formed into a series of packets, based on tactical groupings. This method is the standard method of movement and is used when enemy interference is likely.

8. In order to achieve mobility, planning considerations will include the need for route development, obstacle crossing and breaching and movement control. The mobility of manoeuvre arms, support arms and support services enable the commander to maintain the desired momentum. Army Military Police units control traffic movement within the combat zone to ensure the tempo of operations is maintained. Tactical and administrative movement of military forces, as well as population movements on the military routes, are planned and controlled. Military police units in all formations establish a

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4. The purpose of this manual is to establish the doctrinal basis for the provision of Military Police support to tactical units and formations of the Canadian army

traffic control network, allowing control of the routes necessary for deployment and the sustainment of military forces. Traffic control on the main supply routes allows support services units to sustain the force. Traffic control on the main axis of advance assists manoeuvre arms and support arms units to arrive in a coordinated way to their forming up points.

9. The lines of communication, with their associated command and control arrangements, are a complex mix of joint, combined, civilian and military assets. It spans the strategic, operational and tactical levels of conflict, thus connecting the strategic base with tactical units deployed in theatre. Robust communications and dedicated information technology systems will be needed if the flow of personnel and materiel is to function most effectively. It is planned, as a result of the Gulf War experience and current Canadian doctrine and structure, to advance at a rate of 100 kilometres a day for a maximum of seven days.

10. Techniques, tactics and procedures for the conduct of mobility support tasks assigned to Military Police units are found in B-GL-332-012/FP-001 *Tactical Aide Memoire—Military Police Insert*. Additional information can be found in B-GG-005-014/AF-030 *Road Movement*.[51]

ROAD MOVEMENT PLANNING

> *Mobility is economic movement, i.e., movement that fulfills the law of economy of force. The means to it are the direction given by the commander, the speed with which this is carried out, and the cooperation by which this fulfillment is ensured without check or waste of energy—caused by friction, loss of touch, and misunderstanding of the plan of direction.*
>
> **Captain Sir Basil Liddell Hart, *Thoughts on War*, 1944**

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[51] Replaces B-GL-303-009/FP-001 *Road Movement*.

11. Critical movement will take place in all parts of the theatre of operations. Major traffic conflicts will occur unless adequate control measures are applied. The anticipated movement of forward troops, reserves and support services traffic will govern the positioning of the majority of the formation Military Police.

12. Effective road movement planning is designed to ensure that units and formations are moved in the right order and arrive at the proper place on time. The senior headquarters in theatre is responsible for the evolution and co-ordination of the traffic plan. Subordinate formations and headquarters progressively develop the plan. The co-ordination of traffic is the responsibility of the next higher formation. The G3 staff, in accordance with the commander's direction, establishes the overall policy on movement. The Provost Marshal is often assigned as the primary staff officer within the G3 cell for the preparation of both the tactical movement and traffic control plans.

13. The Provost Marshal assists in planning tactical movements and provides advice on administrative movements based on a thorough reconnaissance and operational requirements. The Provost Marshal:

a. works closely with and provides technical advice to the staff on:

    (1) the capacity and adequacy of routes;

    (2) the degree and type of movement control required; and

    (3) requirements for additional resources;

b. identifies road movement data available including NATO Route Reports;

c. prepares a traffic control estimate;

d. develops traffic control plans and orders to include route signing requirements and traffic control measures; and

e. prepares road movement annexes to operational orders and movement tables for the G3 or in support of the G4.

14. B-GL-332-001/FP-001 *Unit Standing Operating Procedures* provides staff with all the necessary information required for planning road movements. In order to assist planners in producing a movement table quickly and accurately, an automated movement table planning tool is available in B-GL-331-005/FP-001 *Canadian Land Force Electronic Battle Box*. A format for traffic control estimates is provided in B-GL-332-012/FP-001 *Tactical Aide-Memoire—Military Police Insert*.

ROUTE RECONNAISSANCE

15. There are many agencies capable of conducting route reconnaissance in support of a formation. The primary unit conducting route reconnaissance is the formation reconnaissance unit. They conduct reconnaissance on the formation axis of advance forward of the manoeuvre units, whereas Military Police execute this task behind these units, where less protection from the enemy is required. However, a Military Police route reconnaissance is essential to the development of Movement Orders and traffic control plans for units supporting the lead manoeuvre units. Military Police must conduct reconnaissance with a view to providing detailed information to the Commander/staff officer making the final decision on routes. Reports and briefings must be detailed, concise and factual.

16. The tactical situation, the extent of reconnaissance information required and the time/resources available will detail the method of reconnaissance used. Route reconnaissance may be carried out using a map, air photograph, on the ground by foot or vehicle, by air, satellite or by a combination of the above. Technical route reports, prepared by engineers, provide very useful data and should be consulted by Military Police prior to any reconnaissance.

17. Helicopter reconnaissance is less desirable since only a limited perspective of critical points can be obtained. Ground reconnaissance provides complete information, including liaison, but time may prohibit this type of reconnaissance for a long route. An

alternative is a reconnaissance by air and on land only at possible critical points.

18. The same procedures apply to all route reconnaissance but not all require the same degree of detail. Specific requirements for route reconnaissance will be detailed in the reconnaissance task; however, the general categories are Quick, Normal and Special Reconnaissance.

19. Most route reconnaissance are conducted without the participation of other agencies; however, specialist advice is appropriate in some matters. It may be advantageous for engineer, transportation, or other personnel to accompany Military Police on a reconnaissance to add expertise and provide on the spot co-ordination.

20. The necessary information on route conditions, capacity requirements and enemy activity is obtained through command channels, liaison and host nation authorities. Reconnaissance parties are required to check routes, hides, harbours and waiting areas; as well as to check for alternate routes and defiles.

21. Route Reconnaissance Estimates, Route Reconnaissance Orders, Route Reconnaissance Report and Sample Route Card formats are included in B-GL-332-012/FP-001 *Tactical Aide-Memoire—Military Police Insert.*

ROUTE SIGNING

22. Military Police and Engineers will usually be the only organizations to post signs on controlled routes and axes. Engineer signing is normally limited to obstacles including bridges, minefields, fords, etc. Military Police units will sign controlled routes and axes, including defiles, detours, waiting areas, harbours, halts and hazardous areas. In places where obstacles must be negotiated, Engineers will advise and assist the Military Police as required. Effective route signing reduces the number of traffic control posts otherwise required.

23. Units, usually with the support of their integral Regimental Police, will sign their routes for moves to formation Start Points and from Release Points to their new unit location. Additionally, they will

ensure that routes within their headquarters location are signed, and that other required signs are posted.



Figure 3-1: Start Point and Release Point

24. Military Police route signing will conform to B-GG-005-014/AF-030 *Road Movement* which is consistent with international agreements. Where necessary, modifications may be made to suit the availability of signing materials and local conditions/tactical situations. Signing is required for:

a. Assembly areas/approach routes. If time permits, forces which are to be brought together or moved up for an attack use an assembly area where they should remain only for as long as required for their administrative preparation or regrouping. These areas should be out of range of most of the enemy artillery. They should be located so that the approach march from them to the line of departure can be effected smoothly, quickly and using concealed routes.

b. Hides occupied by troops before movement to battle or fire positions.

c. Harbours and temporary areas where enemy interference is considered unlikely, which allow dispersal and concealment during rest, maintenance, replenishment or other administrative activities.

d. Leaguers where armour and mechanized units replenish, perform maintenance and rest. Leaguers are sometimes concealed and adopted by a force for administrative convenience and protection.

e. Waiting areas adjacent to the route or axis that may be used for the dispersal of vehicles, troops and equipment while waiting to resume movement.

f. Defiles where any natural or artificial feature or structure is creating a constricted route thereby restricting manoeuvre or movement.

g. Defiles that are located on portions of a route where traffic is funnelled through, such as water crossings. Defiles are also used to mark routes that traverse hazardous areas.

h. Detours, when movement on a given route must be redirected.

i. Crossing of obstacles for the movement of troops and equipment on the far side.

j. Dumps where combat supplies are placed in anticipation of future operations.

25. Leaguers and waiting areas are often occupied without notice; therefore, route signing will be limited to planned sites such as hides and harbours.

26. Higher formations direct the use of certain signs on routes that they control. Signs erected by Military Police must be verified regularly to ensure they are still providing accurate directions and be removed when they are no longer required. Protection measures may dictate that no route signing be conducted and that limited traffic control points be established.

Figure 3-2: The Pointsman

TRAFFIC CONTROL

27. Command and control of movement is executed by the following elements:

a. **Regulating Headquarters**. An element of the formation headquarters usually establishes this headquarters, although a unit can be assigned this responsibility for specific operations. This headquarters is often supported by aviation and support services elements. Regulating Headquarters controls the execution of the move from the Start Point to Release Point, through the Traffic Control Organization. This headquarters must be in constant communication with formation headquarters. There may also be headquarters or liaison elements from other units or formations moving through a formation's area.

b. **Traffic Control Organization**. A traffic control organization established by Military Police will usually be co-located with the Regulating Headquarters. The Military Police communications net is usually the formation traffic control net. It is used to communicate with Sector Headquarters and supporting elements assigned to the Regulating Headquarters.



Figure 3-3: Traffic Control Post

c. **Sector Headquarters**. The main route might be divided into sectors for ease of control. Military Police sections can be assigned these responsibilities. Military Police Platoons can also be assigned vast sectors for large-scale movement.

d. **Traffic Control Posts**. These are usually formed from individual jeep-teams depending on the size and duration of the task. They should also be administratively self-sufficient. Personnel at traffic posts must know the movement plan to effect control of the traffic flow, and are required to maintain a log identifying each packet as it moves through.

28. Traffic control posts are established at critical points and at hand over points between route sectors. A sector control headquarters may also assume the functions of a traffic control post where the two locations coincide. The location of a traffic control post may be signed to warn traffic of their location. Traffic control posts are manpower intensive and are usually found on main supply routes for which a static control system has been established. Pointsmen provide limited support in comparison with traffic control posts, which often serve as information and straggler posts at the same time. Military Police ensure priority vehicles and those granted the right-of-way are granted priority at the traffic control posts. Military Police can also expect pedestrian traffic during traffic control duties.

29. Unit commanders are responsible for moving their unit to the Start Point. Regimental Police usually provide the route signing and the traffic control for the unit. From the Start Point the moving force follows the sequence, speed and control instructions provided in orders and movement tables. At the Release Point unit commanders reassume responsibility for the movement of their units to the final destination. Hides, harbours, leaguers and waiting areas will usually be controlled by unit hide or harbour masters.

30. Defiles on major routes may cause significant traffic delays, thus traffic control may be required. Military Police use various methods to include radio communications, hand signals, the baton system, escorts and passage of information through the last vehicle to control the traffic. To prevent unnecessary delays it is advisable to have recovery vehicles co-located to clear vehicle casualties.

OBSTACLE CROSSINGS

31. Military Police must have a thorough understanding of this complex operation to provide effective support. Engineer doctrine[52] provides details on the conduct of assault river crossings and should be consulted.

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[52] B-GL-361-001/FP-001 *Land Force Engineer Operations*, Chapter 7, Section 2.

32. Water crossing operations are an integral part of most movement operations. These operations are complex and rely heavily on engineers and Military Police. Crossings are either considered deliberate or hasty.


Phase Line
Up to 3 Km
Obstacle
Up to 3 Km
Crossing Area
Direction of Crossing
Phase Line
Up to 30 Km
CROSSING ORGANIZATION
AA Rodeo
AA Planet
WA
TCP
ERP
Crossing Site Comd
Sec Mov Con
Crossing Area
AA
HQ
MCO
ACTIVITIES
Regroup into tactical formation
Report to Movement Control Post
Crossing
Report to Movement Control Post
Movement by crossing packets to Waiting Areas
Liaison with Movement Control HQ before commencement of crossing operation
Form crossing packets Regroup
Liaison by formation in the planning stage
LEGEND
AA Assembly Area
WA Waiting Area
Crossing Site
Alternative Crossing Site
HQ Tactical Commander's HQ
Crossing Area Crossing Area Commander's HQ
Crossing Site Comd Crossing Site Comd HQ
Engineer HQ in charge of the technical execution and maintenance of crossing sites
MCO Movement Control Organization HQ
Sec Mov Con Sector Movement Control HQ
3 ERP Engineer Regulating Point
4 TCP Traffic Control Post

Figure 3-4: Assault River Crossing Organization

33. Deliberate offensive water crossings are conducted in five overlapping stages that include the approach to the obstacle, assault, build-up, consolidation and break-out stages executed either by the bridgehead, break-out or the force in place.

34. The need for a clear command organization, which plans and executes a complete but simple crossing plan, is paramount in all water crossing operations. This is in order to support the crossing flow and to avoid losses caused by enemy activities. In a crossing operation, the movement of bridging equipment, troops, tracked and wheeled vehicles and their passage through assembly areas must be strictly controlled. This must also apply to movements through waiting areas, over the obstacle and movements on the far side. The controlling headquarters must provide a flexible organization and make best use of the resources available to react to any changes in the crossing flow and the tactical situation. To facilitate the command and control of crossing operations assembly areas, waiting areas, crossing areas[53] and crossing sites[54] must be established.

35. Military Police will usually establish a traffic control organization with the Regulating Headquarters and Sector Control Headquarters on the near bank. Military Police can assist the Engineer reconnaissance. Routes and waiting areas must be carefully selected to ensure the protection and effective movement across defended obstacles.

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[53] A number of adjacent crossing sites under the control of one commander. In water crossing operations, the command and control area may be situated on both sides of the obstacle or one side only, and be bounded by phase lines. This area is kept free of forces, installations and equipment not necessary for the conduct of the crossing or for the defence of the crossing sites. In this area, the engineer commander exercises his technical engineer responsibility.

[54] At the location of a single bridge, raft site, or in an initial assault, at a site for the crossing of assault boats or for the swimming or fording of vehicles on a broad front.

SECTION 3
TRAFFIC REGULATIONS

36. The enforcement of the formation commander's orders requiring traffic control for tactical movements is discussed in Section 2 under traffic control and will not be covered in this section. This section covers enforcement of traffic regulations established by the host nation, the Canadian Forces, or the formation G4.

37. The enforcement of traffic regulations is essential to ensure the safety of all users and the availability of the route network. Unregulated traffic will inevitably result in accidents or congestion that will delay or stop traffic and frequently cause injuries. Strict monitoring and enforcement of movement credits and authorized traffic movement orders is vital. Formation orders, host nation and Canadian Forces traffic regulations, as well as the Criminal Code of Canada, will be enforced by Military Police. At the start of every operation, Military Police must ascertain whether they possess jurisdiction over allied personnel. A standard NATO offence report is sent through the driver's chain of command when required.

38. Contrary to civilian policing, commanders are required to determine if disciplinary measures apply when traffic violation tickets are issued by Military Police. They are also required to determine if disciplinary measures are required subsequent to Military Police reports on offences and accidents. When required by law, Military Police Reports will be prepared and the procedures required by the military judicial system will be started.

39. Support from the drivers on the routes and the Commander is essential to provide safe and unobstructed routes available for operations and sustainment efforts. Military Police seek the co-operation of all soldiers and especially that of commanders to achieve this objective.

40. The formation G4 Transportation establishes local traffic regulations and is appraised of general traffic regulation problems. The G1 is informed of significant individual problems.

SECTION 4
STRAGGLER CONTROL

GENERAL

41. The need for straggler control changes with the phase of operations and the situation of our own troops. Straggler control is manpower intensive and is best done in conjunction with other Military Police duties such as traffic control posts and patrols.

DEFINITION

42. Stragglers are individuals who, without apparent purpose or assigned mission, become separated from their unit. They may be lost, have medical problems or be absent without authority. They must be directed back to their units without delay, receive medical treatment or be detained if necessary.

43. The objective of straggler control is to return all stragglers to their units as quickly as possible so that maximum combat effectiveness is maintained in each unit. The screening at the straggler posts, conducted by Military Police will determine the category in which soldiers belong. The Canadian army has divided stragglers into four categories[55]:

a. **Category A**. Any soldier who has lost his way and is attempting to rejoin his unit. When located, he will be directed to his unit.

b. **Category B**. Any soldier who, from appearance cannot be held responsible for his actions because of a shocked or dazed condition or battle fatigue. He should be treated for shock and be evacuated to the nearest medical facility.

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[55] NATO categorizes stragglers in two categories; injured and uninjured.

c. **Category C**. Any soldier running away for no apparent reason; usually, absentees and deserters. He should be returned to his unit under escort and a receipt should be obtained. A Military Police report will be prepared and, if necessary, the individual will be arrested and detained.

d. **Category D**. Any wounded soldier separated from his unit. He should be evacuated to the nearest medical facility.

RESPONSIBILITIES

44. Prior to commencement of an operation, a straggler line is designated parallel to the forward line own troops for the purpose of controlling unauthorized rearward movement of soldiers. The G3 determines if a straggler control line is required and where it should be located. Military Police establish straggler control posts as required. The Military Police inform the units of the stragglers and of the location of returning soldiers. The stragglers are replaced if their absence is extended. Military Police will ensure allied forces return Canadian soldiers to the appropriate area of operation, usually via the traffic network where Military Police can provide direction. Reciprocal arrangement with allied formations will ensure that allied stragglers are promptly returned to their units.

CONTROL

45. The straggler line is controlled by a series of straggler posts manned by Military Police units reinforced as required. Military Police prepare a straggler post record card for each straggler located.

SECTION 5
POPULATION MOVEMENT CONTROL

GENERAL

46. Friendly and enemy action may cause fear and uncertainty among civilians throughout the area of operation. Civilians may be frightened and convinced to leave their homes in large numbers and be used by the enemy to interfere with tactical movement. This situation could create confusion and panic among the civilian population. It can also incite disobedience to orders issued by both military and civil authorities and provide cover for the infiltration of enemy agents, saboteurs and terrorists and criminal activity including looting. In domestic operations, the threat differs significantly but the movement of civilians can create significant disturbances to military operations.

47. Civilians usually move to improve their chances of survival and their safety. Obviously, fear and frustration is to be expected. Their friends and families will have suffered injuries and deaths and they will leave behind not only their homes but also their lifetime belongings. Once on the move they will seek safe areas as quickly as possible. When moves are not authorized, quick action will be required to funnel civilians safely on non-military routes. Close co-operation with the host nation and non-governmental organizations will be required. International agreements will be required for cross border crossings.

48. Population Movement Control (MC) includes assistance to the host nation for the controlled movement of evacuees and refugees prior to and during combat operations.



(wtn)

More than 15,000 refugees gathered in a dirty camp in Minova, Zaire, 30 miles south of Goma, a city at the border with Rwanda. The camp lacked water and basic sanitation, forcing refugees to use lake water. They are all non-combatant civilians residing in an area of conflict causing them to move.

Figure 3-5: Rwandan Refugees

DEFINITIONS

49. **Evacuee Movement**. Evacuee movement is the movement of civilians who have been ordered or are authorized to move by a competent authority and whose movement and accommodation are planned, organized and controlled. Such movement is often required for the safety of civilians, or to retain freedom of action for military operations.



Figure 3-6: Refugees (Friendly)

50. **Refugee Movement**. Refugee movement includes the spontaneous movement of persons who decide to move *within or outside their country* without the host nation's authority. Consequently, the movement is not planned or controlled. Plans must be made and coordinated between the host nation and the formation G5 whenever possible, to minimize the impact on military operations.

51. **Protected Persons**. Generally speaking, persons protected by the *Fourth Geneva Convention* are those persons who, "at a given moment and in any manner whatsoever, find themselves, in case of a conflict or occupation, in the hands of a Party to the conflict or occupying power of which they are not nationals."

52. Nationals of neutral or co-belligerent states in the territory of a belligerent state will not be regarded as protected persons so long as normal diplomatic relations exist between their state and the belligerent.

53. Persons protected as wounded, sick, shipwrecked, or as prisoners of war under one of the other *Geneva Conventions* are not considered protected under the *Fourth Geneva Convention* as civilians.

54. Correctly identifying the status of persons affected by conflicts is not an easy task and the formation legal officer should be

consulted as required. The *Law of Armed Conflict*[56] and the *Fourth Geneva Convention* should be consulted.

55. Protected persons are entitled, in all circumstances to respect for their persons, their honour, their family rights, their religious convictions and practices and their manners and customs. They shall at all times be humanely treated. They shall be protected, especially against all acts of violence, or threats thereof, and against insults and public curiosity.[57]

RESPONSIBILITIES

56. Where civilian authority exists, the tasks of Military Police are limited to providing assistance primarily through traffic control and the control of persons at staging areas. During population movement control, the civilian population must be protected against the dangers arising from concurrent military operations. In order to facilitate and to accelerate the movement of persons being evacuated, they should be informed of danger areas and of safe routes. When civilian authority does not exist, the Civil-Military Operation Centre is responsible for population movement control and greater responsibilities may be assigned to Military Police.

57. Some civilians, whose status as combatant or non-combatant may be in doubt, should be detained as prisoners of war by Military Police as described in Chapter 5, Section 2. They may be of significant intelligence value and require immediate interrogation. B-GL-332-001/FP-001 *Unit Standing Operating Procedures* provide the necessary details required ensuring these persons are interrogated promptly.

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[56] B-GG-005-027/AF-020 *The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level, Chapter 11 and 12.*

[57] *Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War of August 12 1949*, Part III, Article 27.

58. Civilians committing offences to host nation law and regulations should be arrested and detained by civilian authorities. When they commit an offence contrary to military laws and orders, they are subject to arrest and custody as detailed in Chapter 5, Section 4.

59. The G5 is the primary staff officer that will liase with the host nation government authorities and non-government organizations. He will ensure Commanders are briefed and that reports and returns are prepared. When required, the G4 will be directed to ensure adequate provision for the feeding and transportation of civilians. The G2 will coordinate the collection of information of intelligence value.

CONTROL

60. The co-operation of the civilians may be difficult to obtain. Routes provided may not be the shortest way to their intended destination. Host nation authorities and other military assets should be used to support these types of movement. The civilians must be convinced that the military has concern for their well being and that it is in their best interest to follow the directions given to them, enabling them to reach their destination in the safest possible way.



Figure 3-7: Civilian Collection Point

61. Population movement control is established by allowing movements over secondary routes or along primary routes at

designated and coordinated times. The basic principles of control include:

a. the establishment of check-points on roads;

b. the establishment of holding areas where civilians are kept prior to movement along civilian routes;

c. the provision of security and escort of civilian groups; and

d. the utilization of the best available means for quick movement out of the operational area.

62. Control measures are implemented at the source of movements and along military routes by the establishment of checkpoints. Checkpoints may be combined with existing traffic control or straggler control points. Population centres must be tightly controlled. Control is established by:

a. preventing unauthorized or uncontrolled movement out of population centres;

b. signing of evacuation routes and informing civilian populations of those routes; and

c. utilizing civil authorities in keeping order.

63. At checkpoints, civilians moving along military routes must be diverted from those routes into holding areas or onto civilian evacuation routes.

64. Military Police control checkpoints are to be combined with traffic control posts, adhering to the principle of economy of effort. Liaison between the Provost Marshal, the G5 and the civil authorities is essential in executing the evacuation control plan. When possible Military Police will co-locate with civil police at all critical check points.

SECTION 6
NUCLEAR, BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL TASKS

GENERAL

65. Within the Canadian Forces, the Mission Orientated Protective Posture (MOPP) has been adopted, identifying the appropriate dress for protection. Additionally, pre-attack, attack and post-attack defensive measures will be ordered by the commander that will impose certain adjustments to normal operations. Ultimately, everyone must be prepared to conduct all assigned tasks in an NBC environment, while avoiding unnecessary risks by assiduously adopting appropriate protection measures.

66. Military Police may be equipped and requested to support NBC contamination monitoring operations at traffic control points and provide mobile NBC survey teams along the route network. This will require both common and specialized NBCD skills in hazard recognition, personnel, vehicle and equipment monitoring and surveying techniques, individual and operational decontamination, and NBCD route signing.

67. The G3 NBC will establish the formation NBC reporting and warning control centre advise on the NBC threat and hazard prediction, coordinate all NBC reconnaissance, survey and monitoring activities, and direct NBC contamination control efforts within the formation. Military Police commanding officers must ensure that all their soldiers are self-sufficient and knowledgeable of NBC alarms and protection measures without supervision, enabling them to perform their duties in contaminated areas. Individual protection measures are defined in *Tactical Aide-Memoire* 503 and *Unit Standard Operating Procedures* 501. NBC reporting requirements are identified in *Unit Standard Operating Procedures* 704.

NBC CONTAMINATION AWARENESS AND SURVEYING TASKS

68. Military Police may very well be the first to arrive at a scene where NBC hazards are present. The ability to recognize and sense

NBC hazards and symptoms is a crucial aspect of being the first to respond. Military Police must be capable of performing radiological, biological and chemical first-response recognition and surveys. They range from classical war fighting contamination to release other than attack of low-level radiation and toxic industrial chemicals from damaged industrial complexes or transportation vehicles. Symptoms and treatment are identified in the *Tactical Aide-Memoire* 605.

69. In surveying operations, the ability to conduct route reconnaissance and point surveys is developed by maintaining the following capabilities:

a. set-up and maintain assigned static remote NBC detection and identification systems;

b. operate vehicle mounted and handheld detection and identification systems;

c. recognize the initial signs and symptoms of NBC hazards and contamination;

d. report NBC related details to higher headquarters; and

e. sign contaminated routes and areas.

TRAFFIC CONTROL CHECK POINTS AND MONITORING TASKS

70. After an NBC attack, MPs may be called upon to assist in manning contamination control checkpoints and monitoring tasks. Depending on the boundaries of suspected or confirmed contamination, alternate routes, defiles and hides will have to be reconnoitred, including an NBC survey of existing sites close to the suspected contamination area. All areas and routes will need to marked and signed accordingly. While these are not normal MP tasks, they may be called upon to assist other NBC forces in cordoning off areas and handling vehicle and personnel flow as in any other disaster.

71. During reconnaissance tasks, selection of by-pass routes around contaminated areas is essential. Contamination is generally reduced along vegetation-free tracks and main road networks. Special care must be taken during reconnaissance tasks to quickly recognize being within a contaminated area, find the clean/dirty boundary and conduct operational decontamination to continue the reconnaissance task in the clean area. NBC contamination signs must be posted prior to leaving the border of the contaminated area to prevent the unnecessary exposure to other friendly force elements travelling along the road. Posting of alternate route signs should be posted once bypass routes are found.

72. NBC traffic control is required to reduce the spread of contamination. This type of task can be conducted in a contaminated environment or at a minimum safe distance from a contaminated area. Probable tasks include supporting contamination monitoring to divert clean or dirty traffic along the designated routes. Briefing vehicle commanders on precautionary measures prior to the crossing of contaminated areas and providing on-site traffic and personnel control along the clean/dirty line at thorough decontamination sites.

DECONTAMINATION TASKS

73. Military Police must be able to conduct individual, operational and thorough decontamination of their person and other soldiers, personal equipment, vehicles, and support equipment as defined in *Tactical Aide-Memoire* 503. To maintain the maximum combat efficiency of the limited Military Police resources, the three types of decontamination must be performed.

NBC HAZARD SIGNING

74. The *Tactical Aide-Memoire* 504 contains information on marking contaminated areas with standard NATO signs.

NBC INVESTIGATIONS

75. As is the case for Police Operations, when biological and chemical agents and radiological contamination are intentionally used against friendly forces, it will be necessary to Sample and Identify Biological, Chemical and Radiological Agents (SIBCRA) as evidence for war crime prosecution. The legal requirements for the custody of evidence are the same and these procedures are applied for the custody of NBC first use evidence. Additionally, proper safety procedures must be taken when escorting SIBCRA evidence. The formation G3 NBC is responsible for assembling a SIBCRA team and may request escort assistance from the Military Police.

SECTION 7
AREA DAMAGE CONTROL

76. The purpose of area damage control is to minimize the effects of mass destruction caused by an attack.

77. To re-establish control, Military Police may be required to assist in the relocation of units or formations from the damaged area to regroup themselves or for force reconstitution. Military Police could assist by:

a. establishing check points and assembly areas for the regrouping of units;

b. conducting route signing and traffic control to assist in the evacuation of troops;

c. identifying stragglers and redirecting them to their unit assembly area;

d. supporting engineer operations; and

e. controlling and evacuating civilians in the affected area.

SECTION 8
LIAISON

78. Information on routes, traffic and population movement may be obtained from many sources. Host nation police are often a valuable source. Formal and informal liaison with civilian authorities, all police forces and non-governmental organizations will enable Military Police to obtain information important to operations. This information must be shared amongst Military Police units and formation staff. Good co-operation with civil police forces enables Military Police to anticipate problems.

79. Effective liaison also assists in locating and directing stragglers. The local authorities possess the knowledge of the local population and may be used beneficially to identify strangers to the Military Police. Enemy agents causing or attempting to cause disturbances and to frighten the local population may be identified and handled by military authorities.

SECTION 9
SUMMARY

80. This chapter has discussed doctrine for employment of Military Police in the Mobility Support function. Military Police support operations by enhancing the mobility of troops. Efficient traffic movement, enforcement of traffic regulations, straggler control, population movement and NBC monitoring enhance the mobility on the traffic network. Tactical and administrative movement of military forces, as well as population movements on the military routes, are planned and controlled. Military police units in all formations establish a traffic control network, allowing control of the routes necessary for deployment and the sustainment of military forces. The enforcement of traffic regulations is essential to ensure the safety of all users and the availability of the route network. The objective of straggler control is to return all stragglers to their units as quickly as possible so that maximum combat effectiveness is maintained in each unit. Population Movements Control includes assistance to the host nation for the controlled movements of evacuees and refugees prior to and during combat operations and operations other than war. Military Police may be called upon to conduct NBC route network reconnaissance and surveys, traffic control and NBC monitoring tasks.

Information on routes, population movements and stragglers is available from police forces in place, which will usually cooperate with Military Police.

CHAPTER 4
SECURITY OPERATIONS

> *A general should direct his whole attention to the tranquillity of his cantonments, in order that the soldier may be relieved from all anxiety, and repose in security from his fatigues.*

Frederick the Great, *Robert Debs Heinl's Dictionary of Military and Naval Quotations* (Annapolis: US Naval Institute, 1966)

SECTION 1
GENERAL

1. The fast pace of operations on the non-contiguous battlefield along with the requirement to protect military information and assets dictates the continued need for security. Most views on the future operational environment indicate that the information age is characterized by the proliferation of information systems and the rapid passage of information. Systems include ground systems, air systems, and satellite/space systems. These systems are used to gain information dominance and must be protected against enemy detection and attack. They carry information on personnel, materiel, installations and activities, and they are also used to detect the opponent's activities.

2. Commanders are responsible for the protection of their personnel, material, installations, information and operational activities. They will take a variety of measures required to protect the formation from the effects of enemy weapon systems and natural occurrences. These measures include tactical security, protective security measures (as defined in the glossary herein and articulated in Protection doctrine). Protection measures to which Military Police contribute include protective security and rear area security, which are described in the next two sections.

3. Military Police are mandated to provide advice to commanders on protective security measures necessary to reduce the

threat posed by hostile intelligence services, criminal elements and unauthorized disclosure of information. Protective security measures required to achieve a state of security[58] throughout the spectrum of conflict are identified in *National Defence Security Instructions.*[59] **Military Police support operations by assisting commanders in establishing a secure environment.**

SECTION 2
PROTECTIVE SECURITY

GENERAL

4. Protective security measures available and utilized during periods of emergency and increased tension are essentially the same as those employed in times of reduced threat or tension. Security is achieved through the co-operative effort of all functions, disciplines and organizations. One aspect of security cannot be viewed or considered in isolation of other protection measures.

THREAT RISK

5. The threat posed to friendly forces and the risks accepted by commanders vary for each operation. The porous and open nature of the global information environment makes the command support information infrastructure vulnerable to attack or exploitation at any time. As part of planning for both deployed and garrison operations, commanders at all levels must identify critical vulnerabilities affecting the protection of soldiers, resources, installations, activities and information systems. Intelligence staff will collate information provided from a variety of sources and they will distribute it in the form of intelligence products. The G2 is responsible for advising

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[58] Security is defined in the Glossary.

[59] A-SJ-100-001/AS-001 *National Defence Security Instructions* replaces the *National Defence Security Policy.*

commanders on the threat posed by hostile intelligence services, the enemy or any other threat, such as those that may emanate from partisans or the civilian population.

6. The Canadian Forces Counter-Intelligence Unit is mandated to acquire information on the threat element, primarily through the collection of human intelligence. Military Police do not have this mandate, but in the normal course of their duties, they will gain valuable information. At traffic control posts, information from the civilian population will be obtained. During liaison visits with civilian police, information on the criminal element will be conveyed to Military Police. Civilians being detained will also provide valuable information on the criminal threat. The formation G2 should be provided with this information.

7. In an increased threat environment, commanders must perform a risk management analysis to identify essential elements of information and communication information systems that must be kept free from disruption or corruption. Everything cannot be protected; therefore, the Commander must set priorities.[60] Military Police support consists on providing advice to minimize the risk. Most protective security measures should have been implemented prior to deployment and maintained throughout the operation. The changing threat may require a re-evaluation of the protective security measures required.

8. Protective security measures include personnel, physical, organizational, information and operations security.

PERSONNEL SECURITY

9. Personnel security is that part of protective security concerned with all personnel related measures designed to counteract the threat posed by hostile intelligence organizations, subversive groups or individuals.

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[60] B-GL-300-005/FP-001 *Information Operations*, p. 31.

10. **Security Clearances**. Selected personnel are provided the authorization to access classified or designated information or assets. This authorization is normally granted with the issue of security certification/classification. This should be after confirmation of an individual's suitability to obtain such access on a need-to-know basis. Personnel security requirements should be reviewed for adequacy and maintained at the required level for all unit soldiers.

11. Soldiers, assisted by administrative staff, will prepare the necessary information to obtain a security clearance. Varying level of security clearances exist within Canada and NATO. Commanders must ensure personnel have the necessary level required in the performance of their duties. Military Police assist unit staff in processing this information when required. Commanders concerned with the suitability of an individual to be entrusted with classified information will submit a Change of Circumstances Report.

12. **Identification Cards**. Identification cards and disks, in accordance with CFAOs,[61] are issued by Formation Military Police in support to the National Defence Identification Services. Soldiers shall carry these identity cards at all times and wear their disk when on duty. Personnel with special protection afforded by the *Geneva Conventions*, and others requiring special identification, must ensure they have the required identity cards to be recognized as persons with additional privileges.

13. Lost and damaged identification cards and disks must be reported promptly to Military Police and replaced with temporary identification immediately. The Canadian Military Police will maintain records of lost identification that could be used illegally during operations.

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[61] CFAO 26-3 Identification Cards, CFAO 26-4 Identification Disks, CFAO 26-5 Identification Cards—Geneva Convention—Persons who accompany the Canadian Forces, CFAO 26-13 Geneva Convention Identification Cards and Certificates—Members of the Canadian Forces, and CFAO 26-25 Canadian Attaches Dependants Identification Card.

PHYSICAL SECURITY

14. Physical security is that part of protective security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, equipment, installations, materiel, and documents; and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft.

15. **Physical Security Surveys and Advice**. Effective physical security is essential. However, opportunities to conduct surveys will be limited during operations. Consequently, Military Police will assist units prior to the employment phase of operations. They will provide units with advice on achieving and maintaining high standards throughout the deployment, employment and redeployment phases.

16. During operations, as a minimum, Military Police will conduct physical security surveys of Sensitive Compartmentalized Information Facilities (SCIFs), security areas and restricted areas.

17. Engineer planning staff and Military Police must work together to determine physical security standards and protection requirements for facilities.

18. Physical security of special convoys may be required during operations. Military Police may be required to provide advice and escorts. Such convoys could be carrying weapons, ammunition, explosives, high value, and sensitive or classified cargo.

19. Procedures to implement physical security measures by units and Military Police are included within A-SJ-100-001/AS-001 *National Defence Security Instructions.*

ORGANIZATIONAL SECURITY

20. **Planning**. Units and formations must develop SOPs and local security orders. Routine unclassified aspects of force/installation

security plans are detailed in published SOPs.[62] Security orders amplify or explain higher formation or national-level security orders and detail specific security plans required during specific operations.

21. Security plans complement SOPs by establishing unique requirements to the location where they are deployed. These include information such as the identification of the unit lines, local emergency telephone numbers, a riot control plan and the support available from local authorities.

22. Unit and Formation SOPs shall include:

a. the identification of security zones;

b. access control measures to include the use of passes, passwords, key controls, guards and security patrols must be used to deter egress into secure zones.

c. an alert states system;

d. classification/designation of documents, material and equipment;

e. destruction of classified material in emergencies; and

f. censorship measures.

23. **Protective Security Awareness**. Personnel must understand the definition, nature and dimensions of the threat and their role in achieving and maintaining security. One aspect of the threat, which is not usually evident, is that posed by espionage, terrorists, criminal elements and subversive activities that often target individual soldiers or units. This type of threat is usually covert. Suspicions and identification of this threat must be reported to the formation G2 and the Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit.

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[62] B-GL-333-001/FP-001 *Formation Standing Operating Procedures* and B-GL-332-001/FP-001 *Volume 1 Unit Standing Operating Procedures*.

24. Unit Security Supervisors, assisted by Military Police, will conduct regular security training seminars to maintain a high level of awareness of security issues that are essential for success in operations. The focus should be orientated towards threats to which the unit is susceptible at the time of training.

25. Security briefings and debriefings for soldiers sent to areas subject to specific threats, or having been in a high threat area, will receive a security briefing prior to deployment when possible and a debriefing upon return. The Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit are mandated to provide defensive security briefings and debriefings.

26. **Very Important Persons Security**. The Canadian Forces Military Police Unit will conduct Very Important Persons (VIP) security. The Army's Military Police task is limited to the provision of support that usually includes the preparation of sites to be visited by the VIP, security on routes, outer perimeter security during visits and the preparation of sensitive discussion areas.

27. **Close Personal Protection.**_The protection of key personnel is paramount to the success of operations. Based on the threat, VIP, senior commanders and other high-risk personnel may require additional protection from criminal and terrorist attack or abduction. Specialist security teams, including trained bodyguards, security drivers, and other resources, may be employed to provide Close Personal Protection (CPP) for such personnel.

28. Airfield Security Force Military Police can usually provide specially qualified aircraft security officers to support the movement of designated personnel by fixed and rotary wing aircraft.

INFORMATION SECURITY

29. Information security is that part of protective security concerned with organizational, procedural, physical, and technical measures designed to safeguard all types of information (in verbal, documentary and electronic form) in any operational environment from unauthorized disclosure, modification, destruction, interruption or loss. Information security measures cover the handling, storage,

manipulation, distribution or discussion of information in any form. Information security includes information systems security, in addition to other security measures such as signals security and communications security measures, provided by signals specialists.

30. The identification and marking of information (paper and electronic) that requires protection through physical segregation, the control of access to it by personnel who have a need to know and the appropriate level of access is part of information security. Also included is the exchange of multilateral protocols, which permit commanders to retain confidence while releasing their sensitive information to allied forces or those who need to know but have not otherwise been security certified or cleared.

31. High standards of information security are essential, especially during deployments. Military Police assist units prior to operations, providing them with a high standard of security that must be maintained during operations.

32. Military Police will conduct physical security surveys of information systems. Certification and accreditation of classified systems is vested in Canadian Forces Information Operations Group Headquarters Information Protection Centre (CFIOG/IPC). Technical expertise to ensure information systems meet the security requirement is provided by signals specialists. The Provost Marshal and the Signals Officer will ensure the implementation of the certification and accreditation of information systems is executed in accordance with the approved policy and guidelines.

33. Procedures to implement information security measures by units and Military Police are included within A-SJ-100-001/AS-001 *National Defence Security Instructions,* while A-IM-100-001/AG-000 *ISSEC Certification and Accreditation Guideline* provides detailed information of information and information technology security.

OPERATIONS SECURITY

34. Operations security is the process that gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means. This is to deny the enemy knowledge of the disposition,

capabilities, and intentions of friendly forces. Operations Security concentrates on identifying and protecting those aspects of an operation plan, which are considered vital to the success of the operation. As it is not possible to conceal every military action in support of an operation, security measures should concentrate on those activities that could indicate the existence of an impending operation or reveal any vulnerability. The Operations Security plan will be coordinated at the highest level of command.

35. During combat operations, the prevailing threat posed is that of the enemy. Information protection measures must be implemented to secure information from the enemy while other measures are taken to deny him the ability to collect information. The G3 will coordinate activities to protect information from the enemy and deny him the same. A deception plan, including some Operations Security measures, may also be prepared to mislead the enemy. During operations other than war, the hostile intelligence services and criminal threat may prevail. In such instances, counter-intelligence, Military Police units and Intelligence and Provost Marshal staffs will usually have a greater contribution to the Operations Security Plan.

36. The G2 is a critical member of the staff. Understanding the enemy's capabilities and intentions are key to establishing a viable Operations Security plan. Knowing the enemy's intelligence requirements and capabilities allows for the assignment of appropriate resources necessary for the protection of Essential Elements of Friendly Information (EEFI). Operations Security (OPSEC) assessments are conducted from the adversary's viewpoint.

37. Public affairs plans must respect the need for security of information; for example, unofficial knowledge of an actual or planned operation by the media is not grounds to officially verify or comment on operations. Media statements shall be verified and authorized by the concerned operations and security staffs.

38. To maintain operations security, censorship will occasionally be essential. The information age has made censorship measures more complicated to enforce, but such measures may be vital to the success of some operations. Operational requirements for censorship will have to be explained to soldiers and to the media by commanding officers.

The G1 will usually issue the censorship directives in accordance with direction provided by G3.

INVESTIGATION OF ESPIONAGE, SABOTAGE, SUBVERSION AND TERRORISM

39. The Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit is responsible for detecting espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorist threats emanating from foreign intelligence services. Subsequent action is required to deny foreign intelligence services to succeed in acquiring the intelligence desired.

40. All soldiers are required to report suspected acts of espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorist threats and actions through the chain of command. Military Police, by virtue of their employment, may find such incidents reported to them or may note such incidents during investigations or liaison duties. They must ensure all incidents are reported to the formation G2 and to the Canadian Force National Counter Intelligence Unit for investigation.

41. Canada defines terrorism as: "Activities within or relating to Canada directed toward or in support of the threat or use of acts of serious violence against persons or property for the purpose of achieving a political objective within Canada or a foreign state."

42. Counter Terrorism includes the measures taken to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism, and to prevent, deter and respond to terrorism.

43. Most sabotage operations are intended to demonstrate society's vulnerability to the terrorists. In Canada and other developed countries, sabotage of public utilities can have severe disruptive effects.

44. The counter-terrorism responsibility and mandate are:

a. **Domestic Operations**. The Solicitor General is the lead Federal Minister responsible for co-ordination of Canada's response to terrorist incidents occurring within Canada. In support of the civil authorities, the Department of National Defence is responsible for maintaining an immediate response capability to any terrorist incident in Canada. The Joint Task Force Two (JTF 2) is the Counter Terrorist unit within the Department of National Defence that will provide armed assistance to the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. In case of terrorist incidents, regardless of police jurisdiction, the appropriate RCMP Divisional Headquarters shall be immediately notified.

b. **International Operations**. Counter-terrorist response is the responsibility of host nation security forces. Plans and agreements for counter-terrorism support to Canadian army units and formations during deployed operations, outside of Canada, will be arranged by the Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff (DCDS), and the Canadian Force National Command Element, the theatre headquarters and host nation authorities. The Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Trade is the lead Minister for co-ordination of Canada's response to terrorist incidents involving Canadians or Canadian interests occurring outside of Canada.

45. Military Police units will provide an immediate response to acts of terrorism and sabotage, and ensure that the formation headquarters is advised immediately. The National Defence Headquarters is informed immediately by the chain of command through a Significant Incident Report and by the Military Police Unusual Incident Report.

SECTION 3
REAR AREA SECURITY

GENERAL

46. Rear operations under-pin both deep and close operations. Their purpose is to ensure freedom of action of the force by sustaining

combat operations (whether exploiting success or recovering from combat) and retaining the freedom of action. The superior commander will determine the division of responsibility for the overall protection of the force.

47. Support service activities are complemented by activities such as establishing and securing lines of communication, and protecting uncommitted forces. Units, installations or other locations within the rear operations commander's area of operations may become targets of enemy deep operations. In these circumstances, rear operations will include local deep and close operations to find, fix and strike the enemy to eliminate the threat. Thus the command organization of rear operations needs to include the capability to gather intelligence. The command organization also needs to plan and mount close operations, in addition to its primary role of sustaining the force. To avoid potential clashes of interest or priorities, unity of rear command is essential. Thus a rear operations commander must be appointed at every appropriate level with clear command relationships to all forces located within his designated area of operations.

48. Within the combat zone, host nation support may not be readily available. On the non-contiguous battlefield, longer lines of communications will complicate the security of rear operations.

49. The Canadian concept for rear operations is detailed in *Formation Standing Operating Procedures*.[63]

MILITARY POLICE RESPONSIBILITIES

50. Military Police responsibilities include:

a. **Rear Area Security Patrols**. When sufficient Military Police are available, aggressive patrolling will be carried out on the lines of communications to identify potential threats. Military Police, during the conduct of other tasks such as route reconnaissance, traffic control and population movement control, may also identify and report potential threats.

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[63] The next reiteration of B-GL-300-002/FP-000 *Land Force Tactical Doctrine* will detail the Rear Area Security Concept. This concept is currently being researched and a draft concept is included in B-GL-333-001/FP-001 *Formation Standing Operating Procedures* 513.

b. Mobility Support for quick reaction forces or tactical combat forces moving to combat the threat posed by an enemy force.

SECTION 4
LIAISON

51. Commanders at all levels are responsible for the security of their operations, forces, assets, and installations. With the assistance of their Provost Marshal and Military Police units, they are responsible to keep their units/formations aware of current and potential threats posed by hostile intelligence services or criminal elements, vulnerabilities and risks. Effective security relies on a coordinated approach throughout the theatre. Liaison for all aspects of security is important, as security is only as good as the weakest link. Military Police ensure that relevant information is distributed to intelligence staff and the Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit.

SECTION 5
SUMMARY

52. This chapter has discussed doctrine for the employment of Military Police in the security operations function. The focus of Military Police is protective security. Protective security measures contribute to the overall protection of friendly forces by identifying measures to reduce the threat posed by hostile intelligence services, criminal elements or unauthorized disclosure. Security operations are a command responsibility. Provost Marshals provide commanders with advice and Military Police assist commanding officers by conducting surveys and recommending the implementation of appropriate protective security measures commensurate with the threat.

53. Protective security measures include personnel, physical, organizational and information security. In addition to protective security, Provost Marshals also contribute to Operations Security planning. Military Police contribute Rear Area Security by conducting aggressive route patrols to identify potential threats to vital route infrastructure or military installations.

CHAPTER 5
DETENTION OPERATIONS

> *Prisoners of war do not belong to the power for which they have fought; they are all under the safeguard of honour and generosity of the nation that has disarmed them.*
>
> **Napoleon, *The Military Maxims of Napoleon* 1827**

SECTION 1
GENERAL

1. As stated in Chapter 1, manoeuvrists seek to attack the enemy by shattering his moral and physical cohesion, his ability to fight as an effective coordinated whole, rather than destroying him by incremental attrition. Inciting enemy forces to surrender can achieve the aim of breaking the enemy force's moral cohesion by offering fair treatment for prisoners and wounded, showing respect for the law of armed conflict, offering honourable surrender terms or pursuing other methods that legitimize and encourage his surrender.[64]

2. Defeating the enemy without rounds fired, injuries or a single death is the ultimate success a commander can hope to achieve, but this is unlikely. If prisoners of war are treated in accordance with the *Geneva Conventions* they may find their living conditions superior to those offered by their own units. Coalition Forces during the Gulf War of 1990 found enemy soldiers were happy to be captured and to obtain the basic necessities of life after extended periods of poor living conditions. The end results were favourable to the allies in many ways: fewer casualties on both sides and the garnering of excellent public opinion. Mistreatment of prisoners of war is militarily unwise, illegal, inhumane and immoral.

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[64] B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*, p. 2-2.

3. Maintenance of morale is important to achieve cohesiveness within a unit or formation. The arrest, custody and subsequent detention of soldiers unwilling to abide by orders is required to maintain discipline within the unit. Discipline is essential to unit cohesion.

4. Military Police support operations by ensuring the orderly removal and custody of prisoners and detainees from battlefield.

5. Military Police units are charged with the responsibility of operating detention facilities and co-ordinating the rearward evacuation of prisoners. Tasks within Detention Operations are grouped into three categories, based on the type of detained persons being handled:

a. **Prisoner of War Tasks**. The operation of Prisoner of War Collection Points and rearward evacuation of the prisoners in accordance with the requirements of the *Third Geneva Convention* and Protocol 1 of *Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions.*

b. **Custody of Service Detainee Tasks**. The operation of guardrooms and detention facilities in accordance with the *National Defence Act* to detain Canadian Forces soldiers under arrest.

c. **Custody of Civilian Detainee Tasks**. The operation of detention facilities for civilians.

SECTION 2
PRISONER OF WAR TASKS

In battle you fight and you have to kill. That's the nature of it. But once a man is your prisoner you never touch him.

General Ariel Sharon, *Warrior*, 1989

GENERAL

6. The nature of manoeuverist approach to operations precludes Military Police from holding prisoners of war[65] in the Combat Zone for extended periods. The *Conventions*[66] specify that prisoners of war be evacuated away from the dangers of combat. Military Police units therefore coordinate the escort of prisoners of war away from immediate danger areas. They hold prisoners of war at collection points until their transport can be arranged.

7. Canada, when the Detaining Power, retains the responsibility for the care, custody and control of prisoners of war until they are repatriated after the end of hostilities. The senior Military Police member is accountable for the appropriate treatment of prisoners of war in his custody. B-GG-005-027/AF-020 *The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level,* Chapter 10 provides guidance for the treatment of prisoners of war.

8. Transfers of prisoners of war to another party to the *Geneva Conventions* who is capable of applying the Conventions may occur. In those cases, a memorandum of understanding with that nation must be signed. The J1, in consultation with the senior Canadian Provost Marshal and the legal advisor, will negotiate a memorandum of understanding with other nations, approve transfers and then verify that prisoners of war receive the treatment in accordance with the *Conventions.*

9. Many provisions included in the *Geneva Conventions* relate to the treatment of prisoners of war detained for extended periods. Procedures required by Army Military Police to effect this are detailed in B-GL-332-012/FP-001 *Tactical Aide-Memoire—Military Police*

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[65] Allied forces often use the term Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW). The map symbol abbreviation used within NATO is EPW.

[66] *Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949* and *Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949*, Protocol 1.

Insert. Formation staff responsibilities are defined in B-GL-333-031/FP-001 *Formation Standard Operating Procedures*. Military Police and formation staff responsible for prisoners of war are to familiarize themselves with the *Conventions* in addition to the Canadian procedures.

10. Military Police soldiers and leaders responsible for the custody and escorts of prisoner of war must have a comprehensive knowledge of the *Geneva Conventions*, which contain detailed direction on the procedures for handling prisoners of war. It is crucial that all aspects of the *Conventions* be enforced at all times by all persons handling prisoners of war. The International Committee of the Red Cross, other impartial humanitarian organizations and designated Protecting Powers shall be permitted to visit all places where prisoners of war may be. They may interview prisoners of war and they will be permitted to conduct inspections of the prisoners of war and their facilities without interference.

11. Combatants, including enemy deserters and members of recognized resistance movements, captured during a conflict are prisoners of war and entitled to the protection provided by the *Geneva Conventions*. Persons who accompany the armed forces, such as war correspondents, crews of merchant marine and civil aircraft are also provided the prisoner of war status and are protected by the *Conventions*. Chaplains, medical personnel and other persons identified in the *Geneva Conventions* who accompany the armed forces have retained person status[67] and enjoy, as a minimum, the same privileges provided to prisoners of war. Most persons involved in a conflict who are not prisoners of war will either be released or provided, as a minimum, the same privileges provided to prisoners of war. They will usually have an identification card detailing their status. Spies and mercenaries are not provided the benefits of the *Conventions*; they are subject to Canadian laws when captured. The Law of Armed Conflict[68] provides the background information

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[67] Persons who are not prisoners of war but who are retained by the Detaining Power with a view of assisting prisoners of war.

[68] B-GG-005-027/AF-020 *The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and*

necessary to determine the status of combatants, non-combatants or unlawful combatants.

12. A person whose prisoner of war status is in doubt shall be treated as a prisoner of war until a Canadian tribunal determines his status. Should a review of the tribunal's determination be requested, that person is held as a prisoner of war until the completion of the review.[69]

13. All persons detained will be treated humanely in all instances; they shall be cared for and shall not be subject to any acts of humiliation. It cannot be emphasized strongly enough that detainees must be protected from the effects of further combat operations and the environment. Food, water and medical attention will be provided. Personal property of prisoners of war will be left with them. The treatment of the sick and wounded shall comply with the *Conventions* and the guidance provided in Canadian Force doctrine.[70] Health Service Support[71] doctrine provides additional details on the treatment of prisoners of war requiring medical attention. Copies of the *Geneva Conventions* and the *Additional Protocols* will be made available to prisoners of war in a language they can understand. Complaints of prisoners of war will be noted and forwarded through the chain of command.

14. The G1 will collect all information required by the Prisoner of War Information Bureau from the Military Police. Accurate information is required to trace the location of prisoners of war.

Tactical Level, Chapter 3.

[69] *Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces*, Volume 4, Appendix 1.5, Prisoner-of-War Status Determination Regulations.

[70] B-GG-005-027/AF-020 *The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level,* Chapter 9.

[71] B-GL-343-001/FP-001, *Health Service Support.*

15. Note that treatment of exercise prisoners of war will be subject to guidance from NDHQ. NATO exercises must comply with STANAG 2074 *Treatment of Exercise Prisoners of War during NATO Exercises.*

GENEVA CONVENTION

16. The *Geneva Conventions* mandate the preparation of documentation for each prisoner of war. The required formats are found in the B-GL-332-012/FP-001 *Tactical Aide-Memoire—Military Police Insert.*

DEFINITIONS

17. **Prisoner of War**. Article 4 of the *Third Geneva Convention* and Articles 44 and 45 of the *Additional Protocol 1 to the Geneva Conventions* provide a detailed definition. In general terms, members of enemy armed forces, recognized resistance movements, civilians who accompany the enemy armed forces and persons who take up arms or accompany forces commanded by the enemy force are considered prisoners of war when captured.



Figure 5-1: Prisoner of War Collection Point

18. **Prisoner of War Collection Point**. A designated locality in a forward battle area where prisoners are assembled pending local examination for information of immediate tactical value and subsequent evacuation. It is usually centrally located to the rear of manoeuvre units. The Provost Marshal recommends the location of the prisoner of war collection point to the G3. It should be near a main supply route to facilitate use of empty trucks moving to the rear. The collection point moves frequently following the battle. It is a facility that can be set-up and dismantled quickly with limited medical and feeding capability.



Figure 5-2: Prisoner of War Holding Area

19. **Prisoner of War Holding Areas**. Temporary facilities with adequate accommodations, medical and feeding capability at designated localities above division level to which prisoners of war are evacuated. Prisoners of war screening for further detailed interrogation by Intelligence staff may occur at these holding areas. The Canadian Forces Military Police Unit will establish a prisoner of war holding area or prepare the memorandum of understanding indicating the allied force that will detain prisoners of war that have been captured by the Canadian military.

20. **Prisoner of War Camp**. A camp of a semi-permanent nature established in the communication zone or zone of interior (home country) for the internment and complete administration of prisoners of war. It may be located on, or independent of, other military installations.

PRISONER OF WAR HANDLING

21. Prisoners of war will be searched, guarded, and evacuated upon capture. Injured prisoners of war will be evacuated through the medical evacuation chain and will be provided treatment equal to that provided to our own soldiers.

22. Procedures on searches, guard duties and administrative duties are included in the *Tactical Aide-Memoire—Military Police Insert*. Military Police should maintain an automated database application to track all prisoners of war. This information must be distributed to G1 staff who will in turn ensure that the International Committee of the Red Cross Central Tracing Agency can fulfil its mandate.

23. The responsibilities of the prisoners of war are detailed in the *Conventions*. Military Police must ensure that prisoners are advised of their responsibilities such as their obligation to respect Canadian laws, regulations and the *National Defence Act*.

PRISONER OF WAR EVACUATION CHAIN

24. Military Police supervise and provide advice on prisoners of war collection and handling but do not normally provide guards during their transportation. Transportation and guards for the evacuation from the prisoner of war collection point will be arranged through the G1 staff. Prisoners of war are normally marched or moved by vehicles, but prisoners of war of high intelligence value should be evacuated by the fastest means to interrogation teams or units.

25. The capturing sub-unit ensures the prisoners of war are disarmed, searched and evacuated to the unit prisoner of war collection point as depicted in the figure hereunder. From that location, Regimental Police ensure that the prisoners of war are evacuated to the brigade prisoner of war collection point and that the necessary documentation is prepared.


CANADA
THEATRE OF OPERATIONS
Strategic Level
Operational Level
Tactical Level
General Support
Close Support
Integral Support
Tactical Formation
Unit
Sub-Unit
EPW HOLDING AREA
Canadian EPW Camp
MPU PWHA
9
EPW
5
EPW
Capturing Force
OR
Division PWCP
Brigade PWCP
OR
OR
Allied EPW Camp
EPW HOLDING AREA
Allied PWHA
3
EPW
RP
EPW: Enemy Prisoner of War
RP: Regimental Police
PWCP: Prisoner of War Collection Point
PWHA: Prisoner of War Holding Area

Figure 5-3: Prisoner of War Evacuation Chain

26. A Brigade Group prisoner of war collection point is set-up at a designated locality in a forward area, where prisoners are assembled pending examination for information of immediate tactical value and in preparation for their subsequent rearward evacuation. At this stage, the prisoners of war are informed of their rights and the necessary documentation for each prisoner of war is verified and completed. Personal property and monies seized are to be documented. From the Brigade Group collection point, the prisoners of war are evacuated to either a Division prisoner of war collection point or to an allied prisoner of war holding area.

27. The division prisoners of war collection point ensures that all documentation is accurate and evacuates the prisoners of war to the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit prisoner of war holding area or to an allied prisoner of war holding area.

28. The Canadian Forces Military Police Unit prisoner of war holding area holds prisoners of war until they are transferred to a prisoner of war camp in Canada. Allied prisoners of war holding areas

4. The purpose of this manual is to establish the doctrinal basis for the provision of Military Police support to tactical units and formations of the Canadian army

either evacuate prisoners of war to Canada or to their prisoners of war camp according to agreement's with Canada.

INTERROGATION

29. Specialist interrogators are the only persons authorized to interrogate prisoners of war. Capturing units may attempt to identify the category of prisoners of war through tactical questioning and inspection of personal documents. The extent of this effort is limited to obtaining the information required to complete the prisoner of war's documentation.

30. Priority for evacuation of prisoners of war is in order of category A to D. The categories are defined as follows:

a. **Category A**. High level prisoners of war whose broad or specialist knowledge of the enemy war effort makes it necessary for them to be interrogated without delay by specialist interrogation staff at the highest level.

b. **Category B**. Prisoners of war who have enough information on any subject of intelligence interest to warrant a second interrogation.

c. **Category C**. Prisoners of war who have only information of immediate tactical value and do not warrant a second interrogation.

d. **Category D**. Prisoners of war who are of no interest to intelligence.

31. In view of obtaining information of immediate tactical value, capturing units may conduct tactical questioning at the unit collection point. Only soldiers qualified in the conduct tactical questioning are authorized to perform these duties.

32. Formation Intelligence units may conduct interrogations at formation prisoner of war collection points. During some phases of

the battle, interrogation teams may be attached to forward manoeuvre units in order to conduct interrogations.

33. Captured documents and equipment are all valuable sources of information and intelligence. To exploit this information fully, captured enemy documents and equipment shall be evacuated to intelligence units rapidly.

SECTION 3
SERVICE DETAINEES CUSTODY TASKS

> *No offence must go unpunished, for nothing can cause the men so much harm as lax discipline.*
>
> **Field Marshal Prince Aleksandr V. Suvorov**

GENERAL

34. Disciplined units are successful and undisciplined units often fail and disgrace the nation. Commanders are responsible for maintaining and enforcing discipline within their units. They are assisted by Military Police as detailed in Chapter 6.

35. In order to maintain discipline, it will be necessary at times to hold soldiers in service custody or to detain them for service offences. The Canadian Forces Military Police Unit provides this service for all Canadian units in the theatre of operations. Army Military Police units escort service detainees, service prisoners and service convicts to the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit, where they are held prior to their return to a service prison in Canada or units. In operations where such facilities are not established, detainees will be held temporarily in a unit detention room until they are repatriated to Canada.

COMMITTAL AND RELEASE

36. During operations it is important Military Police ensure committal papers prepared by the unit accompany the soldier in

service custody. The constant movement on the battlefield and limited resources make it difficult to ensure the documentation arrives in the prescribed time if it does not accompany the person in custody. Procedures for units to commit soldiers into custody or detention are detailed in CFAO 114-1 *Committal to Service Prison and Detention Barracks* and A-SJ-100-004/AG-000 *Canadian Forces Military Police Policies and Technical Procedures*. Every effort will be made to ensure soldiers released from custody, in accordance with regulations, are promptly reunited with their units.

ESCORTS

37. Regimental Police usually provide escorts for soldiers in custody to the formation Military Police, who are charged with the responsibility for their escort to the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit. Military Police ensure the safety of the service detainees and ensure they are promptly transported to the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit, where they will be detained in a guardroom.

38. Regulations set out in the *National Defence Act* and A-SJ-100-004/AG--000 *Canadian Forces Military Police Policies and Technical Procedure* and CFAO 22-8 *Prisoner Escorts—Provision, Responsibilities and Conduct* apply.

DETENTION FACILITIES

39. Detention facilities required in-theatre are prescribed in national level orders for the operation. Regulations found in the National Defence Act and Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces apply at all times. A unit detention room or service prison and detention barrack operated by the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit will usually be authorized to hold service detainees for a limited time. In operations other than war, Canadian army Military Police detachments of multinational Military Police units may be required to operate detention facilities.



Figure 5-4: Detainee Collection Point

40. The Canadian Forces Military Police Unit is responsible to repatriate soldiers sentenced to detention or imprisonment to the Canadian Forces Service Prisons and Detention Barracks, Canadian civilian prison or penitentiary.

SECTION 4
CIVILIAN DETAINEE TASKS

AUTHORIZED CIVILIAN DETENTION

41. Canadian forces personnel, where specifically authorized, may be required to detain persons who have been lawfully arrested as indicated in Section 3 of Chapter 6.

42. Military Police are responsible for the care and custody of the detainees until they can be transferred to a higher formation facility or an allied or coalition facility or be returned to host-nation authorities. If credible and lawful civil authorities exist, they should be responsible for detention of non-combatant civilians. If such authorities do not exist, or they are unwilling or incapable of exercising their responsibilities, the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit will take those persons into custody until they can be released to appropriate authorities.

43. During operations other than war, a Status of Force Agreement, a Memorandums of Agreement, the Rules of Engagement or the Use of Force Directive[72] should, in addition to providing the authority to detain civilians, identify any specific treatment that is to be provided to civilians in custody. However, at all times, the standards set by the *Geneva Conventions* for prisoners of war shall be the minimum standard of treatment for civilian detainees. Additionally, the release of civilian detainees to civilian authorities should be detailed in the Use of Force Directive.

SECTION 5
LIAISON

44. Military Police ensure effective liaison exists with all authorities concerned with the treatment of prisoners of war. The proper treatment of prisoners of war is important and Canada must meet its obligations. Adequate liaison with civilian authorities, humanitarian groups and any designated Protecting Power must ensure Canada is seen as being respectful of all international agreements.

45. Civilian detainees should be in the care and custody of civilian authorities and when possible military authorities will ensure any civilian detainee is promptly given to civilian authorities. The co-operation of civilian authorities should be sought to ensure military personnel arrested by civilian authorities are transferred into military custody. Military Police should liase with the civilian police and attempt to ensure a reciprocal agreement is developed to effect these transfers. Legal advice may be required. Legal advisors and G5 staff liase with governmental authorities to ensure military operational requirements are satisfied.

SECTION 6
SUMMARY

46. This chapter has discussed doctrine for the employment of Military Police in the detention function. Military Police support

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[72] B-GG-004-005/AF-005 *Use of Force in CF Operations*, Annex C.

operations by ensuring the orderly removal and custody of prisoners and detainees on the battlefield. Prisoners of war are treated in accordance with the *Third Geneva Convention* and the Protocol 1 of the *Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions*. Detainees and prisoners of war shall be handed over into Military Police custody as soon as possible after capture. Army Military Police ensure that these prisoners of war and detainees are evacuated from units through collection points until they reach a prisoner of war holding area. Prisoners of war and Canadian detainees are evacuated to the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit. A Memorandum of Agreement may direct the evacuation of prisoners of war to allied prisoner of war facilities. Civilians may be detained by Military Police when they have committed offences with respect to military operations. They are transferred to the custody of civilian authorities or the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit if such authorities do not exist or they are unwilling to take custody. Effective liaison ensures the correct authorities, civilian or military, are handling their own detainees.

CHAPTER 6
POLICE OPERATIONS

> *The one overriding characteristic which is applicable at every level from the rifleman on observation post duty, to the policeman, to the civil affairs officer, to the force commander, to the force as a collective whole, is that of credibility... Nothing breaks down the credibility of a force faster than illegal or inappropriate activity on the part of its members.*[73]

> **Major-General J.A. MacInnis**

SECTION 1
GENERAL

1. Commanders and commanding officers are responsible for high standards of discipline within their units. Police Operations assist commanders by establishing crime prevention programs, conducting law enforcement activities and investigating offences.

2. Discipline is essential in maintaining unit cohesiveness. Canada's reputation, as well as that of the Canadian Forces and the Army, is at stake when the Army leadership and the Military Police fail to take prompt and efficient action following illegal activities by Canadian soldiers.

3. This service is intended to assist commanders in the maintenance of discipline, especially in areas away from combat and during periods of rest and recreation. Military Police units, in co-operation with unit commanding officers and formation Commanders, focus on crime prevention in order to maintain discipline rather than to

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[73] "Lessons from UNPROFOR: Peacekeeping from a Force Commander's Perspective" The New Peacekeeping Partnership, Alex Morrison, ed. (Clementsport: The Lester B. Pearson Canadian International Peacekeeping Training Centre, 1995), pp. 182-183.

impose it. Leadership support is essential for the Military Police to assist a commander in maintaining the level of discipline for which Canadian soldiers are recognized. **Military Police support operations by assisting commanders in the maintenance of discipline.**

PEACE OFFICER STATUS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

4. Military Police, appointed for the purposes of section 156 of the *National Defence Act,* are peace officers. They shall enforce the laws of Canada and other laws, acts and conventions as indicated in the *National Defence* Act, the *Canadian Forces Administrative Order 22-4 Security and Military Police Services* and A-SJ-100-004/AG-000 *Military Police Policies and Technical Procedures,* or as directed by the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal.

5. Military Police must be Specially Appointed Persons and possess the required credentials to conduct Law Enforcement and Investigative tasks that require peace officer status. The Senior Military Police Advisors will ensure that only those Military Police are employed as peace officers.

6. Military Police employed in Police Operations will adhere to standard Military Police procedures detailed in A-SJ-100-004/AG-000 *Canadian Forces Military Police Policies and Technical Procedures* and authorized investigation manuals.[74] Customary police procedures continue to apply throughout the spectrum of conflict. Notwithstanding the chaos of war, or the primitive installations and equipment available in operations other than war, the Canadian Forces Military Police standards, policies and standard procedures must be adhered to as closely as possible. When operational emergencies prohibit Military Police from following standard police procedures,

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[74] A-SJ-090-002/FP-001 *Fundamentals of Criminal Investigation*, 6th ed., by Charles E. O'Hara and Gregory L. O'Hara (Charles C. Thomas, Springfield Illinois, 1994), ISBN 0-398-05889-X and A-SJ-090-003/FP-001 *Forensic Evidence in Canada* by G.M. Chayko, E.D. Gulliver and D.V. Macdougall (Canada Law Book, Aurora, ON, 1991), ISBN 0-88804-122-5.

the circumstances shall be included in the Military Police notebook and subsequent reports, and the DCDS shall be notified of the circumstances without delay, with an information copy to the CFPM.

JURISDICTION

7. Military police exercise jurisdiction over all persons who are subject to the *Code of Service Discipline* in or outside Canada, including civilians who accompany the Canadian Forces outside of Canada. As peace officers under the *Criminal Code*, they also have jurisdiction over a person not subject to the *Code of Service Discipline* while the person is on a defence establishment.

8. Some agreements have been ratified by Canada providing Canadian Military Police jurisdiction within NATO countries that have ratified the *Status of Forces Agreement*.[75] The agreement states in part:

> It is the duty of a force and its civilian component and the members thereof as well as their dependents to respect the law of the receiving State, and to abstain from any activity inconsistent with the spirit of the present Agreement, and, in particular, from any political activity in the receiving State. It is also the duty of the sending State, to take necessary measures to that end.

9. Included at Annex C is an extract of Article VII to the *Status of Forces Agreement,* which defines the jurisdiction of Military Police in NATO nations that have ratified this agreement.

10. In cases where host nation police or allied Military Police are investigating, or have arrested Canadian soldiers, Canadian Military Police shall assist and arrange for the transfer of the soldiers into

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[75] *Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces,* Volume 4, Appendix 2.4 *Agreement Between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces,* 19 June 1951.

Canadian custody when requested by the senior commander. All suspected offences will be investigated and tried by the appropriate tribunal.

11. The Governor in Council may, by proclamation, designate any country as a designated state for the purposes of the Visiting Forces Act. In such cases, a member of a visiting force may exercise in Canada the power of arrest conferred on him by the law of his state, in relation to any member (or dependant of the member) of his force.[76]

12. Military Police also have jurisdiction over persons not subject to the *Code of Service Discipline* while the person is on a defence establishment. When persons are not on a defence establishment, Military Police exercise authority over these persons as detailed in Status of Force Agreements, a United Nation mandate or other legal documents that authorize them to arrest, detain and using the necessary force required.

TECHNICAL CONTROL

13. In operations, as in garrison, the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal continues to exercise technical control of Military Police with respect to all police and investigative matters. This control is usually exercised through the Military Police technical chain. During operations, incidents may occur that requires advice from DPM Police or legal staff. In those instances, the expertise of the technical authorities should be consulted. This is particularly true during operations other than war and when the Army is deployed overseas. Advice will be obtained from Legal Officers or the Military Police. When necessary, the Formation Provost Marshal will provide the required advice. The Formation Provost Marshal is authorized direct communication with, via the technical chain of Canadian Provost Marshals, up to and including the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal and the Deputy Provost Marshals. Figure 6 depicts potential Military Police structures and Provost Marshals found in a theatre.

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[76] *Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces,* Volume 4, Appendix 2.2, Visiting Forces Regulations.

14. Military Police are authorized direct communication with higher, lower and lateral Military Police organizations in the execution of police duties.

15. Military Policy After Action Reports concerning police operations will be distributed by J3 MP prior to deployment and will be returned by Military Police commanding officers upon completion of the operation. This is aimed at improving police procedures during deployments. Formation commanders should be provided a copy of the After Action Report.

MILITARY POLICE REPORTS

16. Reports, documents and records shall be kept separate from all other operational or administrative reports. The Canadian Forces Provost Marshal ensures directives on the distribution of reports for deployed units are promulgated. The usual distribution of Military Police Investigative Reports will usually be adhered to unless DPM Police dictates otherwise. Procedures for incidents of significance, requiring a Military Police Unusual Incident Report, continue to apply for all police related matters while on deployment of any kind.

17. When Military Police are assigned to NATO Combined Military Police Units, the reports will be distributed by the Commander of the NATO Combined Military Police to DPM Police via the Canadian Provost Marshal in theatre. The senior Canadian Military Police of the combined unit must ensure this is executed in a timely fashion.

18. Military Police documentation that has not already been forwarded to DPM Police, such as Daily Occurrence Books and Local Distribution Reports, shall be forwarded at the end of an operation. During peace support operations, copies of Military Police documentation shall be copied and forwarded to DPM Police at the end of a rotation.

STAFF RESPONSIBILITIES

19. Formation Provost Marshals are responsible to ensure that Commanders and staff with the need-to-know are apprised of police matters. The G1 and the Legal Advisor are the main staff officers requiring police information.

SECTION 2
CRIME PREVENTION

GENERAL

20. In Canadian army doctrine of 1957 it states: "The service policeman's duty is the prevention of military crime. It is better to prevent an offence than to allow it to happen and then to arrest the perpetrator. However, if an offence is committed, he must take immediate steps to apprehend the offender."[77] Although this was written many years ago, Military Police must still favour prevention of crime to the enforcement of laws, regulations and orders.

21. Crime prevention recognizes criminal opportunities exist and initiates the means to reduce or eliminate these opportunities, thereby reducing the chance that crime will occur and minimizing the impact of loss or damage when it does occur. An effective crime prevention plan has demonstrated substantial potential to reduce the cost of crime, foster greater teamwork, improve the quality of life and therefore enhance operations.

PREVENTATIVE POLICING

22. Combating crime is a process in which there are many stakeholders. Police are the service providing the day-to-day lead in preventing crime. However, a proactive prevention plan requires the

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[77] CAMT [illegible]0-1 1957 *Canadian Army Manual of Training Provost Duties*, p. 2.

involvement of the community, the leadership and the police. The need for crime prevention transcends the spectrum of conflict.[78]

23. During intense operational periods, the need for preventative policing is minimal and the opportunities to conduct it are reduced. More aptly, it is during periods of rest and recreation, and sustained periods of static tasks, where discipline may suffer the most. Soldiers participating in local activities or working with the local populace may be subject to the criminal elements within the host nation. Morale may be significantly affected if soldiers were to be unnecessarily restricted. The vast majority of soldiers are hard working and trustworthy. Unfortunately, unruly soldiers will always be present and they must be dealt with through effective leadership and discipline.

24. Incidents of looting, illegal requests, black marketeering, gambling, use of drugs, abuse of alcohol or inappropriate sexual relationships are historically areas of concern during conflicts. More recently, during operations other than war, illegal or inappropriate incidents occurred having security or ethical consequences that have impacted on the Army's reputation. With command support, Military Police can develop an effective crime prevention plan to reduce the occurrence of such incidents.

25. The crime prevention plan should include the criminal threat, specific areas of concern to a commander, possible deterrents, restrictions and curfews. The plan must be realistic and recognize human nature.

26. Preventative policing fosters greater respect from the soldier than the more repressive policing required by law enforcement.

SECTION 3
LAW ENFORCEMENT

Few men are brave by nature, but good order and

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[78] *The Army's Military Police—A Strategic Plan to Optimize Operational Capability* prepared by the Land Staff Provost Marshal dated 6 April 1998.

> *experience make many so. Good order and discipline in an army are to be more depended upon than courage alone.*
>
> **Niccolo Machiavelli, *The Art of War*, 1521**

GENERAL

27. Law enforcement tasks consist of those measures necessary to enforce laws, orders and regulations to ensure the existence of a lawful and orderly environment. A commander's orders, including those outlined in the crime prevention plan, must be enforced by the Military Police.

28. During the course of any duty, Military Police continually conduct law enforcement.

POLICING

29. A-SJ-100-004/AG-000 *Canadian Forces Military Police Policies and Technical Procedures* detail procedures for Police Operations applicable throughout the spectrum of conflict. The focus of policing changes depending on how a force is employed within the spectrum of conflict, or at what phase of an operation the force is. Military Police must recognize and be prepared to adjust to changing demands.

30. During the employment phase, primitive facilities, limited equipment or specialist resources, chaos inherent to combat and operational priorities mean that it may not always be possible to apply the accepted standard of garrison policing. Military Police must strive to maintain professional standards in challenging circumstances.

31. Within an operational theatre, Canadian Forces personnel, where specifically authorized, may be required to arrest civilians who:

a. interfere with the accomplishment of the mission and related tasks;

b. otherwise use, or threaten, force against friendly forces or the equipment and materials belonging to friendly forces or under their protection;

c. enter an area under the control of friendly forces without prior authorization;

d. are suspected of breaches of the law of armed conflict; and

e. are suspected of having committed, or having conspired to commit, acts of terrorism, espionage, subversion and/or sabotage.

32. Civilians arrested by persons other than Military Police must be promptly transferred into the custody of the Canadian Military Police or other authorized custodial personnel.

33. Co-operation with all police forces, especially that of the host nation must be sought immediately upon the arrival of Military Police units in the different locations where they may be deployed. Time, resources and significant energy can be saved in a co-operative policing effort. For this reason, in many types of operations, Combined Military Police Units are formed. This is discussed in Section 5 of Chapter 2. Military Police should be viewed, through their actions within the parameters established by law, as integral members of units and formations.

SECTION 4
INVESTIGATIONS

GENERAL

34. Offences committed against Canadian Forces personnel and property degrade military discipline, morale, and operations. Investigation of crimes and offences is necessary to support a commander's operational capabilities.

35. All Military Police conduct investigations. Some investigations will be assigned to the investigation section integral to Military Police units and more serious cases will be assigned to the CFNIS.

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIONS

36. *NDHQ Policy Directive Military Police Investigation Policy*[79] provides direction concerning the conduct of investigations. The CFNIS normally investigates all offences of a serious and sensitive nature for all military members. Investigations involving only civilians, excluding those involving civilians accompanying the Canadian Forces, will be conducted by Canadian or host nation civilian police forces. The policy provides the necessary procedural details.

37. The National Investigations Service operates independently of the chain of command and is commanded by the Canadian Forces Provost Marshal. Notwithstanding, the purpose of the CFNIS is to support the chain of command in the execution of the assigned mission. When National Investigation Unit investigators are deployed for operations, including domestic operations, they will normally be placed OPCON to the senior Canadian Provost Marshal. When not actively involved in investigations they are employed with the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit. The CFNIS has the authority to lay charges as a result of their investigations.

38. Allegations of breaches and grave breaches to *The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949* and *Protocols Additional to The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949* will be investigated and offenders will be brought before Canadian courts as indicated in the *Criminal Code* and the *National Defence Act*. Accordingly, Military Police may be required to investigate allegations of:

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[79] Distributed under cover of 2120-4-0 (DPM Police 3) dated 22 December 1997 and will be included in the revised A-SJ-100-004/AG-000 *Canadian Forces Military Police Policies and Technical Procedures*.

a. excessive use of force by Canadian Forces personnel contrary to B-GG-005-004/AF-005 *Use Of Force In CF Operations*;

b. unlawful killings, torture and inhumane treatment of persons;



c. unnecessary destruction of property;

d. crimes committed against the civilian population by Canadian Forces personnel; and

e. mistreatment of prisoners of war.

Figure 6-1: Dispatches, Vol 4, No. 2 by the Army Lessons Learned Centre

39. Additionally, Military Police may be required to investigate:

a. allegations involving violations of the rules of engagement, laws of armed conflict[80] or international law;

b. mistreatment of detainees;

c. weapon discharges where carelessness or negligence is suspected; and

d. complaints and claims against Canadian Forces or Canadian interests.

SECTION 5
CUSTOMS

40. Whether in support of transportation movement or redeployment, personnel and cargo leaving or returning to Canada must meet customs requirements. Through co-ordination with Revenue Canada—Customs and Excise, the Canadian Forces Military Police Unit may be authorized to assist re-deploying units in obtaining pre-clearance of customs. This ensures compliance with and generates early detection of violations of the *Customs Act* and applicable provisions of the *Status of Forces Agreement*.

SECTION 6
LIAISON

41. A coordinated law enforcement effort will limit the conditions and opportunities that promote crime, thereby preventing diversion of military resources and maintaining military discipline. Maintaining liaison and co-ordination with other Military Police organizations, federal, provincial and local police forces, host nation military and civilian authorities, multinational police organizations and governmental agencies is essential to effective policing. Effective

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[80] B-GG-005-027/AF-020 *The Law of Armed Conflict at the Operational and Tactical Level,* Chapter 16 defines the different war crimes, individual and command responsibilities and the judicial process.

liaison will ensure the *Status of Forces Agreement* is implemented when Canadian troops are deployed in other NATO nations and will be beneficial to Military Police.

SECTION 7
SUMMARY

42. This chapter has discussed doctrine for employment of Military Police in the police function. Military Police support operations by assisting commanders in the maintenance of discipline. As discussed, jurisdiction and correct assignment of investigations are complex. Directives and agreements must be reviewed to ensure Military Police operate within the established regulations. Army Military Police focus their police efforts toward the prevention of crime through the implementation of a crime prevention plan. Military Police seek the co-operation of other police forces and governmental agencies in conducting Police Operations.

ANNEX A
MILITARY POLICE FUNCTION MATRIX

MILITARY POLICE FUNCTIONS	TASKS		LEVELS OF CONFLICT					
	MILITARY POLICE TASKS	SUBORDINATE MILITARY POLICE TASKS	STRATEGIC	OPERATIONAL		TACTICAL		
				IN CANADA	DEPL	GENERAL	CLOSE	INTEGRAL
MOBILITY SUPPORT OPERATIONS	**Road Movement**	**Assist in Planning**	J4 Mov	MP Det	PM & J4 Mov	Army MP	Army MP	
		Conduct Route Reconnaissance	J4 Mov	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP	Army MP	Army MP
		Conduct Route Signing	J3 MP	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP	Army MP	Army MP
		Traffic Control	J3 MP	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP	Army MP	Army MP
	Traffic Regulation	**Enforce Traffic Regulation**	DPM Police	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
	Straggler Control	**Conduct Straggler Control**	J3 MP		CFMPU	Army MP		
	Population Movement Control	**Assist Movement of Evacuees**	J5		CFMPU	Army MP	Army MP	
		Assist Movement of Refugees	J5		CFMPU	Army MP	Army MP	
	NBC Monitoring	**Monitor and Mark Contaminated Areas**	J3 NBC		CFMPU	Army MP		
	Area Damage Control	**Assist Area Damage Control Operations**	DCDS	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		
	Liaison	**Routes & Traffic Information**		MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
		Straggler Information			CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
		Population Movement	J2 Plans&Pol 4	G2	CFNCIU			

4. The purpose of this manual is to establish the doctrinal basis for the provision of Military Police support to tactical units and formations of the Canadian army

MILITARY POLICE FUNCTIONS	TASKS		LEVELS OF CONFLICT					
	MILITARY POLICE TASKS	SUBORDINATE MILITARY POLICE TASKS	STRATEGIC	OPERATIONAL		TACTICAL		
				IN CANADA	DEPL	GENERAL	CLOSE	INTEGRAL
SECURITY OPERATIONS	**Protective Security**	**Personal Security**						
		>Personnel Secur Clearances	DPM Secur	MP Det/CSIS	CFMPU	Army MP		
		>Identification	ADM HR (Mil)	MP Det / CFSU Ottawa SsecurO	CFMPU	Army MP		
		Physical Security						
		>Provide Advice	DPM Secur / J3MP	MP Det	PM	Army MP		
		>Conduct Surveys	DPM Secur / J3MP	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		
		Organizational Security						
		>Assist in Planning	DPM Secur	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
		>Secur Education / Awareness	DPM Secur	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
		>Secur Briefings & Debriefings	J2 Plans&Pol 4	CFNCIU	CFNCIU			
		>VIP Security	DPM Secur /J3MP	JTF 2	CFMPU			
		>CPP	DCDS	JTF 2	JTF 2			

MILITARY POLICE FUNCTIONS	TASKS		LEVELS OF CONFLICT					
	MILITARY POLICE TASKS	SUBORDINATE MILITARY POLICE TASKS	STRATEGIC	OPERATIONAL		TACTICAL		
				IN CANADA	DEPL	GENERAL	CLOSE	INTEGRAL
		Information System Security						
		>Provide Advice	CFIOG/IPC	MP Det	PM	Army MP		Army MP
		>Conduct Surveys	DPM Secur	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
		OPSEC Planning Advice	J3 MP	MP Det	PM	Army MP		
		Investigations						
		>Report Espionage and Subversion Activities	J2 Plans&Pol 4	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP	Army MP	Army MP
		>Investigate Security Incidents	J2 Plans&Pol 4	CFNCIU	CFNCIU			
		>Report and Counter Sabotage and Terrorist Attacks	DCDS / J2Plans&Pol 4 / J3 MP	MP Det/ CFNCIU/JTF2/ RCMP	Host Nation / CFNCIU			
	Rear Area Secur	**Route Patrols**	J3 MP	MP Det	Host Nation / CFMPU	Army MP		
	Liaison	**Anti-Terrorism**	J2 Plans&Pol 4	CFNCIU	CFNCIU			
		Counter Intelligence Information	J2 Plans&Pol 4	CFNCIU	CFNCIU			

MILITARY POLICE FUNCTIONS	TASKS		LEVELS OF CONFLICT					
	MILITARY POLICE TASKS	SUBORDINATE MILITARY POLICE TASKS	STRATEGIC	OPERATIONAL		TACTICAL		
				IN CANADA	DEPL	GENERAL	CLOSE	INTEGRAL
DETENTION OPERATIONS	**PW Tasks**	**Conduct Escorts**	J3 MP	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
		Operate Facilities	J3 MP		CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
	Service Detainee Custody Tasks	**Conduct Escorts**	DPM PC	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
		Operate a Detention Guard Room	DPM PC	MP Det	CFMPU			
		Operate CFSPDB Facility	DPM PC & J3 MP	CFSPDB				
	Civilian Detainee Tasks	**Operate Detention Facilities**	DPM PC/J3 MP		CFMPU			
		Release to Civilian Authorities	DPM PC / J3 MP	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		
	Liaison	**Detention Services**	DPM PC	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP

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MILITARY POLICE FUNCTIONS	TASKS		LEVELS OF CONFLICT					
	MILITARY POLICE TASKS	SUBORDINATE MILITARY POLICE TASKS	STRATEGIC	OPERATIONAL		TACTICAL		
				IN CANADA	DEPL	GENERAL	CLOSE	INTEGRAL
POLICE OPERATIONS	**Crime Prevention**	**Preventative Policing and Deter Black Market, Prostitution, Gambling, Alcohol, etc.**	DPM Police & J3 MP	MP Det	PM / CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
	Law Enforcement	**Conduct Law Enforcement**	DPM Police & J3 MP	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
	Conduct Investigations	**Investigate Criminal Offences**	DPM Police	MP Det	CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
		Investigate Serious Criminal Offences	DPM Police	CFNIS	CFNIS			
		Investigate War Crimes	CO CFNIS, DPM Police & J3 MP	MP Det	CFMPU & CFNIS	Army MP		
	Customs	**Assist Customs Canada**	J3 MP		CFMPU			
	Liaison	**Police Forces**	DPM Police	MP Det	CFNIS & CFMPU	Army MP		Army MP
		Criminal Intelligence	DPM Police	MP Det	CFNIS & CFMPU	Army MP		
		Customs	J3 MP		CFMPU			

Conflict is waged at three levels — the strategic, operational, and tactical. Each level is defined according to the nature and purpose of the military operations being conducted and the outcomes they are intended to achieve. They are not dependent on the size of the forces engaged or the level of command involved. Although the levels of conflict form a hierarchy, there are no sharp boundaries, and they often overlap. B-GL-300-000/FP-000 *Canada's Army*, p. 78. Definitions of the levels of conflict are included in the Glossary.

ANNEX B
ARMY MILITARY POLICE HISTORY

1. Canadian Military Police fought in both World Wars, in Korea and continue to serve in operations other than war today. In May 1965, *THE CANADIAN PROVOST CORPS, SILVER JUBILEE 1940-1965*, was published under the authority of Colonel A.R. Ritchie, CD, Director of Security, Canadian Forces Headquarters. This journal was published to commemorate the Silver Jubilee of the Canadian Provost Corps and included an excellent history of Canadian Military Police in battle reproduced hereunder.

THE CANADIAN PROVOST CORPS

A Very Short History—The Canadian Provost Corps[81]

The Englishmen which went alande fell to drinking of hot wynes and were scarce masters of themselves. Some ran to the Stewes, some broke hegges and spoyled orchards and wyneyards and orynges before they were ripe, and did many other outrageous deeds. Wherefore the chef of the town of Caleys came to complains to the lord Darcie in his shyppe, which sent forth his Provost Marshal which scarclie with payne refrayned the yomen archers, they were so hot and wilfule: yet by commandment and policies they were all brought on borde their shyppes". This incident, according to the "Biography of Thomas, Baron Darcy" and referring to a British expedition in the year 151 1, shows that the troubles of the then Provost Marshal, "Henry Guylford, Esquire, a lusty young man and well-beloved of the King", differed not greatly from those who followed him at Avellino, Groningen, Soest and Sin-San-Ni. The Articles of War of the various British monarchs from the

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[81] Taken from the *Canadian Army Journal*, Volume 9, Number 3 dated July, 1955.

Middle Ages until the passing of the Army Act in 1879 make many references to the Provost Marshal and his Provost Company and their duties, which were connected largely with discipline. In 1557, under Bloody Mary, he had as part of his headquarters establishment a chaplain, two judges, two gaolers and two hangmen. History would lead us to believe that they were all busy. In 1625, during the reign of Charles I the Provost Marshal was responsible for the execution of punishment awarded by Military Court as well as being allowed to take summary action. "...hath charge of all manners Tortures; as Gyves, Shackles, Bolts, Chains, Bilbowes, Manacles, Whips and the like, and may by his Ministers use them, either in case of judgement or commandment from a Marshal Court, or otherwise upon unruliness at his own discretion. He is by his officers to see that all places of Execution are prepared and furnished with engines fitting to the judgement; whether it be Gallows, Gibets, Scaffolds, Pillories, Stocks or Strappadoes, or any other engine which is set up for terror and affright to such as behold it." Although today there are no "Tortures, Stocks or Strappadoes" the provost service is responsible to carry out military punishment whether the sentence be one of detention or death. The history of British and American armies are replete with stories of the duties and importance of the provost service, which in campaigns added such "Q" duties as requisitioning and control of the wagon trains to its "A" aspects of impressment, discipline and supervision of camp followers. It is surprizing that Canadian history is devoid of any mention of a provost service prior to 1914. During the First World War, Military Police (Canadian Expeditionary Force) were employed on detachments at the various military districts in Canada. On 3 April 1918 the Corps of Canadian Military Police, with an establishment of 850 men in Canada, 294 in England and 160 in France, was formed. There were 34 horses on strength and the ever-present notes on the establishment authorized – “50% of L/Cpls. may be graded as A/Cpls. without pay” and “...duty pay of 20/c per them...for all NCOs.” On I November 1918, Colonel Gilbert Godson, DSO, DCM,

4. The purpose of this manual is to establish the doctrinal basis for the provision of Military Police support to tactical units and formations of the Canadian army

ADC, was appointed as Provost Marshal, Dominion of Canada. He held this appointment until 9 March 1920, when the office and the Corps of Canadian Military Police ceased to exist. On the outbreak of war in September 1939 each District Depot had a number of Garrison Military Police on its war establishment. These, together with battalion and other regimental police, patrolled streets in the larger cities and operated guardrooms at the various centres of troop population. From this inauspicious start, what was later to be the Canadian Provost Corps grew to the strength of approximately 8000 officers and men at the end of the war.

The Field Force

During the First World War, traffic control in active theatres gradually became the responsibility of mounted military policemen. With the decline of the horse and the advent of mechanization in the British Army, the military policeman and his motorcycle became an integral part of the division. In 1936, provost companies were formed and trained in the art of traffic control. In Canada, there were no military police in either the Permanent Active Militia or Non-Permanent Active Militia but the mobilization plan included a provost company with each formation. On I November 1939, Canada's first provost company was formed from volunteers from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police. This small force congregated at Rockcliffe Barracks in Ottawa, spent one day being outfitted, one day learning military law and three days transferring their equestrian abilities to Norton motorcycles. Their "basic training" completed, they went overseas with the main body of the First Canadian Infantry Division. Of this original group more than 50 per cent were later commissioned and served with the different provost units overseas and in Canada. As the Second Canadian Infantry Division was being mobilized, No. 2 Provost Company (CASF) was formed and trained by sections in the different military districts. This company, which had a high percentage of civil policemen, arrived in Aldershot at the time of Dunkirk. It was placed under command Seventh British Corps until October, when it rejoined its parent formation. At this time No. 3 Provost Company arrived overseas with the advance contingent of First Canadian Corps. The three field companies then began "to learn the hard way" during division and Corps manoeuvres in the winter of 1940-41. As each successive formation arrived overseas it was accompanied by its own provost unit. By the end of 1941, in addition to the field companies, there were two base companies, a detention barracks, a field punishment camp, a training depot and a special investigation section. During 1941 and early 1942 the training continued. After Exercise Beaver III an Independent Brigade Group Detachment from No. 2 Company slipped away to the Isle of Wight for assault landing training. On 19 August 1942 the Canadian Provost Corps was blooded at Dieppe. Their role was to control of the beach and guard prisoners of war but in the debacle that followed the landing, the men joined and fought with the infantry and engineers. Twenty-eight of the 42 who embarked were casualties. This same company a couple of years later signed and controlled the roads to Dieppe, but this time from the landward side. In July 1943, No. 1 Company landed in Sicily and were joined in Italy later in the year by Nos. 3 and 5 Companies with First Canadian Corps. An L of C Company and Military Detention Barracks were also in the theatre. With the Eighth Army the Corps came into its own, first during the advance up the Adriatic and then through the Liri Valley to Rome. At the Moro River in December 1943, L/Cpl. Butler was awarded the Military Medal. This was the first of 67 British awards, 13 foreign awards and 111 mentions during the war. As the Provost in Italy were painting and erecting "Out of Bounds" signs while "at rest" just north of Naples, word came through that D-Day for France had arrived. No. 4 Company landed with Third Canadian infantry Division and was joined at intervals of a few days by Nos. 2, 13, 8 and 11 Companies. These companies, backed up by the British traffic control units with First Canadian Army, had virtually no rest from the time they landed on the continent until the following summer. They were joined by the "Spaghetti-leaguers" in February 1945 and men from every company eventually became part of 2/4 Provost Company when the Occupation Force was formed. The history of the Canadian Provost Corps in Europe is naturally bound up with its work on traffic control, the prime function of the provost in battle. Despite battle, however, the need for disciplinary patrols never ceased and the investigators were always kept busy. The work of the Special Investigation Section and investigations successfully completed by company NCOs is a history in itself.

In Canada

As the field force grew, so did the numbers of Military Police at home. The term "MP" was dropped and the name "Provost" substituted. A new badge, embodying the Royal Cipher, was authorized and on 15 June 1940 the Canadian Provost Corps was born. For the first few months provost duties consisted entirely of disciplinary patrols, but as new jobs of a quasi-police nature appeared, these responsibilities were accepted. In the spring of 1941, the Canadian Provost Corps assumed the responsibility for the movement of prisoners of war and internees and during the next two years 26,000 prisoners were escorted to and from various camps across the country. Administration of Detention Barracks was a provost responsibility from the start. At one time 31 barracks with a staff of more than 800 had rooms for 2000 "non-paying guests". In July 1942, the responsibility of the apprehension of absentees and deserters was taken over from the Royal Canadian Mounted Police and special powers were granted by Order in Council to provost personnel so that they could require any person to produce his national registration. That these sweeping powers were used wisely was attested when the National Defence Act of 1951 also gave special powers to all trained provost. One further duty of the provost was the policing of all dock areas, railway stations and mainline trains. On 1 November 1942, A-32 Canadian Provost Corps Training Centre was established to produce a monthly requirement of 80 reinforcements for field units and 50 for home units, and finally, in September 1942, Canadian Women's Army Corps Provost were added to the list. By 1945 the strength of the Canadian Provost Corps in Canada reached 3500.

Post-War

In 1946 under Plan H the peacetime strength of the Regular portion of the Corps was cut to 17 officers and 222 other ranks. Other ranks were further reduced in 1947 to the extremely low figure of 118. This number was supposed to do the normal provost duties including special investigation, operate six detention barracks and conduct training at a corps school. The strength of the corps was gradually increased; the Korean War followed by the NATO European contribution built up the strength to its peacetime peak of 100 officers and 1400 other ranks. This has now been restricted to coincide with the existing manpower ceiling, but with fewer disciplinary duties the Canadian Provost Corps is now well balanced. Trades pay is now at the Group 3 level, detention barracks staff are being trained in modern penal methods and a staff of special investigators is being formed and trained. The Canadian Provost Corps School at Camp Shilo is one of the best in the Army, training has reached a very high standard and, as an indication of the Corps' skill in musketry, the rifle team from No. 1 Provost Company won the Brigade championship in 1999, in Germany. Despite the dearth of provost in the Regular Army after the Second World War, an excellent Militia organization was established. Six divisional companies and two corps companies dispersed across Canada kept the corps spirit alive, and through these eight units more than 1000 young men found their way into the Regular forces.

The Far East

During the Korean War, a Canadian Provost force of 150, integrated with the British and Australians, were a part of the famous Commonwealth Division. The Canadians operated the only Detention Barracks in Korea and supplied police and criminal investigators from Tokyo to Seoul. One award and four mentions were made to members of the detachment operating with the Twenty-fifth Infantry Brigade during the period of hostilities. Great strides have been made since the formation of the Corps of Canadian Military Police in 1918 and its successor, The Canadian Provost Corps in 1940. The superior education, intelligence and physique demanded of a recruit before admission to the force has developed a corps which is second to none. The "C Pro C" realizes, however, that it has a long way to go before it reaches its goal—the *corps d'élite* of the Canadian Army.

By Major Q.E. Lawson, MBE, CD, Deputy Provost Marshal, Army Headquarters, Ottawa

CANADIAN PROVOST CORPS MEMORIAL

2. About 8000 served in the Army's provost forces overseas during the Second World War. The first to see action was a detachment of No. 2 Provost Company, which landed and fought with Canadian troops at Dieppe, France, in August 1942.[82]

3. The Canadian Provost Corps, the Army's police force since the early days of the Second World War, observed its silver jubilee 15 June 1965 to mark 25 years of service in peace and war. Highlight of the celebrations was the unveiling on 13 June of a corps memorial

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[82] Extract from *Canadian Army Journal*, Volume 19, Number 2 dated 1965

at the Canadian Provost Corps School in Camp Borden, Ontario, by the wartime provost marshal and former commissioner of prisons for the Province of Quebec, Colonel P.A. Puize.

ORIGIN OF THE PROVOST MARSHAL

4. The origin of the staff position of the Provost Marshal is unclear. Hereunder are cited two references indicating the origins of the position.

5. In an article entitled "Its History and Development—The Military Staff"[83] by Major E.J. Perkins wrote:

> …by 300 BC military staffs were beginning to emerge in a pattern that is familiar to-day. The basis of the staff organization which Alexander the Great used with such success was created by his father, Philip of Macedon. Philip also created a provost marshal to enforce discipline and camp regulations. Alexander used the system created by his father throughout thirteen years of constant warfare extending over all the known world. Military genius that he was, Alexander would not contend that his conquests were a one-man show. How then did he exercise command? It appears that the basis of Alexander's staff was several officers under his personal direction acting as chief of staff, adjutant, aides-de-camp as well as specialist officers. We know that certain officers were entrusted with one special duty that included supply, medical services, engineer works and provost marshal duties. Since Alexander used his missile-throwing weapons very efficiently it is logical to assume that there was an artillery officer. There was also a well established system of communications, with an officer charged with this responsibility.

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[83] Extract from Major E. J. Perkins, DSO, Directorate of Military Training, Army Headquarters, Ottawa article taken from the *Canadian Army Journal*, Volume 7, Number 1 dated April, 1953.

Colonel P.A. Puize, OBE, ED a retired permanent force officer who was appointed first Provost Marshal during the second world war, and Colonel L.H. Nicholson, MBE, a former Provost Marshal and present Honorary Colonel Commandant of the Corps, read the memorial tablet to fallen members of the Canadian Provost Corps after its unveiling at the Canadian Provost Corps School, Camp Borden, Ont., 13 June last <1965>. The memorial is situated in "Stewart Square", named in honour of the late Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Stewart, MBE, CD, who served as Provost Marshal following the Second World War and who made a major contribution to the development of the infant Corps.

Figure B-1: Canadian Provost Corps Memorial

6. According to the *Grand Dictionnaire Encyclopédique Larousse*, the origin of the Provost Marshal designation dates to the 14th Century and is described as:

> *Prévôt des maréchaux, officier ayant sous l'Ancien Régime, des attributions de police et de justice. (Les*

> *prévôts commandaient des maréchaussées et leur compétence était à l'origine limitée aux gens de guerre. En les chargeant de la répression des «crimes de grand chemin» que les auteurs soient civils ou militaires, François 1er, en 1536, avait étendu leurs attributions, tout en les plaçant dans un état de subordination effective vis-à-vis des autorités administratives et judiciaires.)*[84]
>
> *[Translation]*
>
> The head of marshals—under the Old Regime, an officer entrusted with law enforcement powers. (Marshals commanded the mounted constabulary force and their area of jurisdiction was originally limited to warriors. In 1536, François 1er expanded their area of jurisdiction to include civilians, as part of the mandate to suppress major crimes; marshals were subordinate to the administrative and judicial authorities.

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[84] *Grand Dictionnaire Encyclopédique Larousse,* Librairie Larousse, 1984.

ANNEX C
STATUS OF FORCES AGREEMENT

1. The following is an extract from the Queen's Orders and Regulations, Appendix 2.4 Agreement Between The Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty Regarding the Status of Their Forces, 19 June 1951.

ARTICLE VII

1. Subject to the provisions of this Article,

(a) the military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise within the receiving State all criminal and disciplinary jurisdiction conferred on them by the law of the sending State over all persons subject to the military law of that State;

(b) the authorities of the receiving State shall have jurisdiction over the members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences committed within the territory of the receiving State and punishable by the law of that State.

2. (a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over persons subject to the military law of that State with respect to offences, including offences relating to its security, punishable by the law of the sending State, but not by the law of the receiving State.

(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall have the right to exercise exclusive jurisdiction over members of a force or civilian component and their dependents with respect to offences, including offences relating to the security of that State, punishable by its law but not by the law of the sending State.

(c) For the purposes of this paragraph and of paragraph 3 of this Article a security offence against a State shall include

(i) treason against the State;

(ii) sabotage, espionage or violation, of any law relating to official secrets of that State, or secrets relating to the national defence of that State.

3. In cases where the right to exercise jurisdiction is concurrent the following rules shall apply:

(a) The military authorities of the sending State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction over a member of a force or of a civilian component in relation to:

(i) offences solely against the property or security of that State, or offences solely against the person or property of another member of the force or civilian component of that State or of a dependent;

(ii) offences arising out of any act or omission done in the performance of official duty.

(b) In the case of any other offence the authorities of the receiving State shall have the primary right to exercise jurisdiction.

(c) If the State having the primary right decides not to exercise jurisdiction, it shall notify the authorities of the other State as soon as practicable. The authorities of the State having the primary right shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the other State for a waiver of its right in cases where that other State considers such waiver to be of particular importance.

4. The foregoing provisions of this Article shall not imply any right for the military authorities of the sending State to exercise jurisdiction over persons who are nationals of or ordinarily resident in the receiving State, unless they are members of the force of the sending State.

5. (a) The authorities, of the receiving, and sending States shall, assist each other in the arrest of members of a force or civilian component or their dependents in the territory of the receiving State and in handing them over to the authority which is to exercise jurisdiction in accordance with the above provisions.

(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall notify promptly the military authorities of the sending State of the arrest of any member of a force or civilian component or a dependent.

(c) The custody of an accused member of a force or civilian component over whom the receiving State is to exercise jurisdiction shall, if he is in the hands of the sending State, remain with that State until he is charged by the receiving State.

6. (a) The authorities of the receiving and sending States shall assist each other in the carrying out of all necessary investigations into offences, and in the collection and production of evidence, including the seizure and, in proper cases, the handing over of objects connected with an offence. The handing over of such objects may, however, be made subject to their return within the time specified by the authority delivering them.

(b) The authorities of the Contracting Parties shall notify one another of the disposition of all cases in which there are concurrent rights to exercise jurisdiction.

7. (a) A death sentence shall not be carried out in the receiving State by the authorities of the sending State if the legislation of the receiving State does not provide for such punishment in a similar case.

(b) The authorities of the receiving State shall give sympathetic consideration to a request from the authorities of the sending State for assistance in carrying out a sentence of imprisonment pronounced by the authorities of the sending State under the provision of this Article within the territory of the receiving State.

8. Where an accused has been tried in accordance with the provisions of this Article by the authorities of one Contracting Party and has been acquitted, or has been convicted and is serving, or has served, his sentence or has been pardoned, he may not be tried again for the same offence within the same territory by the authorities of another Contracting Party. However, nothing in this paragraph shall prevent the military authorities of the sending State from trying a member of its force for any violation of rules of discipline arising from an act or omission which constituted an offence for which he was tried by the authorities of another Contracting Party.

9. Whenever a member of a force or civilian component or a

dependent is prosecuted under the jurisdiction of a receiving State he shall be entitled -

(a) to a prompt and speedy trial;

(b) to be informed, in advance of trial, of the specific charge or charges made against him;

(c) to be confronted with the witnesses against him;

(d) to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favour if they are within the jurisdiction of the receiving State;

(e) to have legal representation of his own choice for his defence or to have free or assisted legal representation under the conditions prevailing for the time being in the receiving State;

(f) if he considers it necessary, to have the services of a competent interpreter; and

(g) to communicate with a representative of the Government of the sending State and, when the rules of the court permit, to have such a representative present at his trial.

10. (a) Regularly constituted military units or formations of a force shall have the right to police any camps, establishments or other premises which they occupy as the result of an agreement with the receiving State. The military police of the force may take all appropriate measures to ensure the maintenance of order and security on such premises.

(b) Outside these premises, such military police shall be employed only subject to arrangements with the authorities of the receiving State and in liaison with those authorities, and in so far as such employment is necessary to maintain discipline and order among the members of the force.

11. Each Contracting Party shall seek such legislation as it deems necessary to ensure the adequate security and protection within its territory of installations, equipment, property, records and official

information of other Contracting Parties, and the punishment of persons who may contravene laws enacted for that purpose.

ANNEX D
INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS

Reference	Title	Promulgation
NATO		
STANAG 2033, Edition 6, Amendment 1	*Interrogation Of Prisoners Of War*	6 December, 1994
STANAG 2035, Edition 6	*Signing of Headquarters and Installations*	21 October, 1993
STANAG 2044, Edition 5	*Procedures for Dealing with Prisoners of War*	28 June, 1994
STANAG 2067, Edition 5, Amendment 2	*Control and Return of Stragglers*	10 June, 1987
STANAG 2074, Edition 7	*Treatment of Exercise Prisoners of War During NATO Exercises*	15 October, 1998
STANAG 2084, Edition 5, Amendment 4	*Handling and Reporting of Captured Enemy Equipment and Documents*	20 October, 1980
STANAG 2085, Edition 4, Amendment 1	*NATO Combined Military Police*	24 February, 1988
STANAG 2176, Edition 2, Amendment 1	*Procedures for Military Road Movement Across national Frontiers*	27 April, 1981

STANAG 2363, Edition 2	*Security Doctrine – AINTP-2(A)*	3 June, 1993
STANAG 2395, Edition 2	*Water Crossing Procedures*	25 March, 1997
STANAG 2454, Edition 1	*Regulations and Procedures for Road Movements and Identification of Movement Control and Traffic Control Personnel and Agencies—AMovP-1*	6 July, 1998
STANAG 2844, Edition 2	*Counter-intelligence Procedures*	4 December, 1987
STANAG 2889, Edition 3, Amendment 3	*Marking of Hazardous Areas and Routes through them*	26 March, 1984
STANAG 3680, Edition 4, Amendment 1	*NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French)—* AAP-6(U)	January, 1995
AJP 2.2	*Counter-Intelligence and Security Procedures (4th Study Draft)*	27 October, 1999
APP 1.2	*NATO Military Police Doctrine and Procedures (Study Draft 1)*	10 December, 1999
APP-12 (Study Draft 1)	*NATO Military Police Doctrine and*	19 November, 1999

	Procedures	
ABCA		
QSTAG 1091, 1st Draft	*Operations Security*	
QSTAG 2026, 2nd Draft	*Principles and Procedures for Tracing and Tracking Personnel in an ABCA Coalition Force*	Jan 99
OTHERS		
	The Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949	
	Protocols Additional to the Geneva Conventions of August 12, 1949	1977, amended 30 November 1993

GLOSSARY

TERM	DEFINITION
Close Support	That action of supporting forces against targets or objectives which are sufficiently near the supported force as to require detailed integration or co-ordination of the supporting action with fire, movement or other actions of the supported force. This includes the action of a force, or portion thereof, which aids, protects, complements, or sustains any other force. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.)
Counter-Espionage	Action designed to detect and counteract espionage. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.)
Counter-Intelligence	Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteraction the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services, or organizations, or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.)
Counter-Subversion	Action designed to detect and counteract subversion. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.)

TERM	DEFINITION
Counter-Terrorism	Measures to reduce the vulnerability of individuals and property to terrorism, and to prevent, deter, and respond to terrorism. (B-GG-004-005/AF-000 *Canadian Forces Operations*)
Detainee	Means a person in the custody of a unit or other element of the Canadian Forces who has committed a belligerent act. (*QR&O* Volume 4, Appendix 1.5 Prisoner-of-War Status Determination Regulations)
Displaced Person	A civilian who is involuntarily outside the national boundaries of his country. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)
Espionage	Actions directed toward the acquisition of information or other material through clandestine operations, or the collection of information by secret means for intelligence purposes. (A-SJ-100-001/AS-000 *National Defence Security Policy*)
Evacuees	Resident or transient persons who have been ordered or authorized to move by competent authorities, and whose movement and accommodation are planned, organized and controlled by such authorities. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)

TERM	DEFINITION
General Support	That support which is provided to a force as a whole and not to any particular sub-division thereof. Within the combat zone, it is the most centralized support relationship and it is of a more static nature, comprising time consuming or complex functions. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.)
Host Nation Support	Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis and war by a host nation to Allied forces and NATO organizations, which are located on or in transit through the host nation's territory. The basis of such assistance is commitments arising from the NATO Alliance or from bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded between the host nation, NATO organizations and (the) nation(s) having forces operating on the host nation's territory. Also called "host nation assistance". (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.)
Inmate	Means any person undergoing punishment in a service prison or detention barrack. . (*QR&O* Volume 4, Appendix 1.4, Regulations For Service Prisons And Detention Barracks
Insurgency	An organized movement aimed at the overthrow of a constituted government through use of subversion and armed conflict. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.)

TERM	DEFINITION
Integral Support	The immediate, organic support provided to a unit commanding officer to deal with tasks of immediate concern to his operations. (B-GL-300-004/FP-001 *Sustainment.*)
Mobility	A quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfil their primary mission. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)

TERM	DEFINITION
Operational Level Of Conflict	The operational level of conflict links the strategic and tactical levels. It is at this level that military campaigns and major operations are planned, conducted and sustained to accomplish strategic objectives within theatres or areas of operations. Activities include commanders deciding when, where, and under what conditions to apply force and engage in or decline battle, always with reference to the strategic aim. The operational level of conflict entails sequencing tactical events to achieve operational objectives, and initiating actions and applying resources to bring about or sustain those events. Military actions at the operational level are usually joint (involving more than one service); and often combined (involving the armed forces of more than one country). They may also include Special Forces operations. A key characteristic of the operational level is its effort to link together, coordinate and expand assorted and limited tactical level actions into operational and even strategic level significance. (B-GL-300-000/FP-000 *Canada's Army*, p. 79.)
Operations Security	The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.)*

TERM	DEFINITION
Physical Security	That part of security concerned with physical measures designed to safeguard personnel, to prevent unauthorized access to equipment, installations, material and documents, and to safeguard them against espionage, sabotage, damage, and theft. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)
Prisoner Of A War Compound	A subdivision of a prisoner of war enclosure. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)
Prisoner Of War Branch Camp	A subsidiary camp under the supervision and administration of a prisoner of war camp. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)
Prisoner Of War Camp	A camp of a semi-permanent nature established in the communication zone or zone of the interior (home country) for the internment and complete administration of prisoners of war. It may be located on, or independent of, other military installations. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)
Prisoner Of War Collecting Point	A designated locality in a forward battle area where prisoners are assembled pending local examination for information of immediate tactical value and subsequent evacuation. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)

TERM	DEFINITION
Prisoner Of War Enclosure	A subdivision of a prisoner of war camp. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.)
Prisoner Of War Personnel Record	A form for recording photograph, fingerprints, and other pertinent personal data concerning the prisoner of war, including that required by the Geneva Convention. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.)
Protected Internee	Means a person interned in Canada who is protected by the Geneva Convention, set out in Schedule IV of the Geneva Conventions Act. (*Geneva Conventions Act)*
Protected Prisoner of War	Means a prisoner of war who is protected by the Geneva Convention set out in Schedule III of the Geneva Conventions Act. (*Geneva Conventions Act)*
Protecting Power	Means a neutral or other State not a Party to the conflict which has been designated by a Party to the conflict and accepted by the adverse Party and has agreed to carry out the functions assigned to a Protecting Power under the Geneva Conventions. (*Geneva Conventions Act)*

TERM	**DEFINITION**
Protection	Protection encompasses those measures the force takes to remain viable and functional by protecting itself from the effects of enemy weapon systems and natural occurrences. (B-GL-300-001/FP-000 *Conduct of Land Operations—Operational Level Doctrine for the Canadian Army*)
Protective Security	The organized system of defensive measures instituted and maintained at all levels of command with the aim of achieving and maintaining security. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)
Refugees	Persons who, because of real or imagined danger, move of their own volition, spontaneously or in violation of a stay-put policy, irrespective of whether they move within their own country (national refugees) or across international boundaries (international refugees). (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)
Sabotage	The intentional destruction, disruption or disabling of equipment, material or facilities by or for a hostile element. (A-SJ-100-001/AS-000 *National Defence Security Policy*)

TERM	DEFINITION
Security	1. The condition achieved when designated information, materiel, personnel, activities and installations are protected against espionage, sabotage, subversion and terrorism, as well as against loss or unauthorized disclosure. 2. The measures necessary to achieve this condition. 3. The organizations responsible for those measures.(APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)
Security Certification	A certification issued by competent national authority to indicate that a person has been investigated and is eligible for access to classified matter to the extent stated in the certification. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)
Security Classification	A category or grade assigned to defence information or material to indicate the degree of danger to NATO/national security that would result from its unauthorized disclosure and the standard of protection required to guard against unauthorized disclosure. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)

TERM	DEFINITION
Security Clearance	An administrative determination by competent national authority that an individual is eligible, from a security standpoint, for access to classified information. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)
Security Intelligence	Intelligence on the identity, capabilities and intentions of hostile organizations or individuals who are or may be engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)
Service Convict	Means a person who is under a sentence that includes a punishment of imprisonment for two years or more imposed on that person pursuant to the Code of Service Discipline. (*National Defence Act*)
Service Custody	Means the holding under arrest or in confinement of a person by the Canadian Forces, and includes confinement in a service prison or detention barrack. (*National Defence Act*)
Service Detainee	Means a person who is under a sentence that includes a punishment of detention imposed on that person pursuant to the Code of Service Discipline. (*National Defence Act*)

TERM	DEFINITION
Service Offence	Means an offence under the National Defence Act, the Criminal Code or any other Act of Parliament, committed by a person while subject to the Code of Service Discipline. (*National Defence Act*)
Service Prisoner	Means a person who is under a sentence that includes a punishment of imprisonment for less than two years imposed on that person pursuant to the Code of Service Discipline. (*National Defence Act*)
Straggler	Any personnel, vehicles, ships or aircraft which, without apparent purpose or assigned mission, become separated from their unit, column or formation. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.)
Strategic Level Of Conflict	Conflict at the strategic level entails the application of a country's resources—moral, economic, scientific, technological, and military—to achieve political objectives which are critical to the national interest. The strategic level of conflict establishes national military aims, provides direction, crafts strategy, allocates national resources, and imposes conditions and limitations on the military actions to be undertaken. (B-GL-300-000/FP-000 *Canada's Army*, p. 79.)

TERM	DEFINITION
Subversion	Action designed to weaken the military, economic or political strength of a nation by undermining the morale, loyalty or reliability of its citizens. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)
Tactical Level Of Conflict	The tactical level of conflict is where subordinate commanders plan and conduct battles and engagements within the operational level campaign effort. Activities focus on integrating and applying combat functions such as firepower and manoeuvre to defeat the enemy, at a particular time and place, and the immediate exploitation of success. It is at the tactical level of conflict where combat and non-combat operations are carried out. (B-GL-300-000/FP-000 *Canada's Army*, p. 80.)
Tactical Security	In operations, the measures necessary to deny information to the enemy and to ensure that a force retains its freedom of action and is warned or protected against an unexpected encounter with the enemy or an attack. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions.*)

TERM	DEFINITION
Terrorism	The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious, or ideological objectives. (APP 6(V) *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*.)

LIST OF ACRONYMS

Acronym	Definition
BSA	Brigade Support Area
CFAO	Canadian Forces Administrative Orders
CFIOG/IPC	Canadian Forces Information Operations Group Headquarters / Information Protection Centre
CFMPU	Canadian Forces Military Police Unit
CFNCIU	Canadian Forces National Counter Intelligence Unit
CFNIS	Canadian Forces National Investigation Service
CFPM	Canadian Forces Provost Marshal
CFSPDB	Canadian Forces Service Prison and Detention Barracks
CIRT	Computer Incident Response Team
CIS	Communication and Information Systems
CPP	Close Personal Protection
CS	close support
DAOD	Defence Administrative Orders and Directives
DCDS	Deputy Chief of the Defence Staff
DPM	Deputy Provost Marshal
DPM PC	Deputy Provost Marshal Plans and Co-ordination
DPM Secur	Deputy Provost Marshal Security

Acronym	Definition
DSA	Division Support Area
GS	general support
IO	Information Operations
IPB	Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield
JTF2	Joint Task Force 2
MP	Military Police
MP Det	Garrison Military Police Detachment
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical
NBCD	Nuclear, Biological and Chemical Defence
NDA	National Defence Act
OOTW	Operation Other Than War
OPP	Operation Planning Process
OPSEC	Operations Security
PM	Provost Marshal
QR&O	Queen's Regulations and Orders for the Canadian Forces
RAS	Rear Area Security
RCMP	Royal Canadian Mounted Police

4. The purpose of this manual is to establish the doctrinal basis for the provision of Military Police support to tactical units and formations of the Canadian army

Acronym	Definition
RP	Regimental Police
Secur	Security
SIBCRA	Sample and Identify Biological, Chemical and Radiological Agents
UN	United Nations
VIP	Very Important Persons
VVIP	Very-Very Important Persons